

JPRS-UMA-92-018
20 MAY 1992



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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

19980120 075

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Kornukov Predicts Decline in Combat Readiness by 1993

92UM0999A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS in
Russian No 16, 15 Apr 92 p 13

[Interview with Col Gen Avn Anatoliy Kornukov, commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, by Yuriy Golotyuk under the rubric "The Army": "Moscow Is Becoming a Border Area"]

[Text] On 31 March combat units of the Moscow Air Defense District repelled a massive attack on the capital. The "enemy" attacked from the northwest. Dozens of bombers and cruise missiles were headed there at various altitudes, from extremely low (a few dozen meters) to heights of many kilometers. The air battle was quickly over. The enemy did not get through.

It only transpired on radar screens, however. It was a routine test of combat readiness. Nonetheless, Col Gen Avn Anatoliy Kornukov, commander of the Moscow Air Defense District, admitted, it was a difficult trial for him and his subordinates. "The district demonstrated that it is capable of protecting Moscow from aerospace attacks today."

"I can guarantee that we can maintain this level until the end of this year. If nothing changes, however, our combat capability will decline as early as '93. Decline drastically."

The Soviet leadership always devoted a great deal of attention to the capital's air defense. And although wicked tongues said that the Politburo was more concerned about its own security than about the city's multimillion population, the fact remains that a powerful air defense system, a multilayer missile "ring," was built around Moscow. The unique Moscow Air Defense District (incidentally, the only one in the former USSR) was formed. It monitored an enormous territory: 1,300 kilometers from north to south, 1,100 kilometers from west to east. The area of more than a million square kilometers, included 25 oblasts in Russia, three autonomies and part of the territory of Ukraine and Byelarus. The capital's air defense system, built during the cold-war years, was designed to destroy a significant part of the enemy's air forces on the distant approaches to Moscow in case of a conflict. "How many air targets could we shoot down simultaneously?" I asked. Col Gen Kornukov hesitated for a second before answering: "I imagine that this question is still of interest to the Pentagon. Many. In any case more than the number we could anticipate. I shall name the extremely hypothetical figure of a thousand."

That does sound impressive. However.... "The Moscow Air Defense District is now becoming essentially a border district," Kornukov is forced to admit. An admission which holds the promise of very, very unpleasant consequences for us all. It could never have occurred to one of the people who established the Moscow "ring"

that the capital's PVO [air defense] district would have to operate on its own. After all, it was a component of an enormous, complex system. The roles were precisely defined. Should a conflict occur, the air defense units located in the forward defense area, which is what the military traditionally called the territory of our Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe, would be the first to receive the enemy's air strike. The first action of an air war would be played out there, in the "buffer zone" separating the USSR from a "potential enemy." Air defense units in the first echelon, deployed along the Soviet Union's borders with the Baltic area, Byelarus and Ukraine, would then go into action. They would receive complete intelligence on the air enemy from their colleagues in the forward defense zone and destroy a maximum number of targets. Those targets which succeeded in breaking through would be turned over to the PVO fighters of the Moscow "ring." The latter would only have to finish up the job.

But a global conflict with massive air raids is an extreme situation. In a more realistic situation, however, which might involve one or two dangerous flying objects headed for the interior of Russia, the main mission of the forward defense zone and the first echelon was to intercept the target in good time and report its parameters to the capital's PVO system, enabling it to prepare, to determine the degree of danger and shoot the target down if necessary. Strategic bombers are far from slow-moving aircraft, after all, and missiles fly even faster. The time between detection and their destruction of their target is therefore calculated in minutes. At least it was when the Moscow "ring" received information from radar stations in the forward defense area and the first echelon. Now that the capital's district has become the border district, however, the PVO personnel have only seconds at their disposal.

The forward defense zone was lost with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. The last units of the former Soviet Army are leaving Eastern Europe. And with the breakup of the USSR, a hole was also made in our first PVO echelon. The most powerful and armed with the most modern weapons and equipment, it apparently does not want to have anything to do with protecting Russia's skies. The nation's former 8th Air Defense Army, for example, which is deployed in Ukraine, was transferred to the republic's command and was recently named exclusively "Air Defense of Ukraine." With all the attendant consequences. "We pass on to Ukraine information on flights by civilian and military aircraft and on their routes. In short, on the air situation. They give us nothing," says Col Gen Kornukov. "In addition, our district has been forced to remove its subunits to the territory of Russia. They just departed from Ukraine. They left behind equipment, officers who did not want to leave.... We still have one regiment in Krichev in Byelarus. When we depart from there, that will be the last. There will be nothing left outside of Russia. We could previously consider the capital's defense zone to be

deeply echeloned and remote from the border. Now we have to say good-bye to the logistical installations. Today we can only count on ourselves."

It is the colonel general's opinion that we must immediately reduce the standard time needed to put the PVO units into a heightened state of readiness and the time allocated for the crews to prepare and destroy an air target. This means that the PVO personnel would have only a moment to decide "destroy or not destroy." This increases the risk of error, of course. And a decision either to destroy or not to destroy can be equally fateful for the PVO personnel.

We could comfort ourselves with the thought that the cold war is behind us, that the likelihood of a global conflict is lower than ever before. If it were all just a matter of the nuclear threat.

"Except for a small circle of professionals, few people ever heard that the unified PVO system protected an enormous number of facilities of so-called secondary danger against attacks from the air and from space," Col Demedyuk, chief of the Directorate of Main PVO Staff, explained. "I am talking about nuclear electric power plants, chemical industry enterprises and dams at hydroelectric power plants, the destruction of which with even conventional weapons could create damage considerably exceeding that of Hiroshima or Chernobyl. If some extremist should strike at one of these facilities today, the results could be terrifying. Take an enterprise which would appear innocuous at first glance, a large refrigerator combine. If the containers of nitrogen contained therein were damaged, this could result in severe contamination of entire regions. Or consider another example: an attack by terrorists on one of the dams of the hydroelectric power plants in the Volga-Don system. It would make no sense to employ nuclear weapons here. It would be enough to destroy one of the dams, and the enormous quantity of water itself would finish up the terrible job. Our specialists tried to calculate the possible results of such a terrorist act. The wave of water would move toward Krasnodar Kray. It would be 3 meters tall or more and would virtually sweep away everything in its path. There would be no need for tanks or guns. There would be nothing left. It would be the end."

Units of the Moscow PVO District cover more than 600 especially dangerous facilities, including 40 state area hydroelectric power plants, hydroelectric power plants and heat and power plants, and eight nuclear electric power plants. The units are disastrously low on men, however. Some of the battalions which stand alert duty are at half-manning, lacking primarily in privates. With each induction they have been reduced even more, and today, given the breakup of the USSR, many of them want to return to their sovereign states ahead of schedule. Desertion has become a chronic problem. District personnel try not to think of what the current, spring draft will be like. They have little faith in miracles. As a result officers are already increasingly being assigned to jobs designated for enlisted men. And if this

were only on the alert crews. In some places officers are having to be assigned to guard facilities. Particularly where depots and arsenals have to be guarded.

The situation with the personnel will be followed by problems of supplying the units with equipment and weapons. There is obviously no money to buy new equipment. But how can we repair at least that which the troops already have? There were only a few specialized plants in the Union. Some of them are in Ukraine. And PVO aircraft were repaired in Azerbaijan....

The capital's PVO district is now standing watch over Moscow's border skies. For now.

Khalturin Clarifies Resignation From Officers' Union

*92UM0985A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 May 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Former Russian Reserve Officers' Union Collegium Chairman—Chief of the Main Staff Reserve Major-General F. Khalturin: "I Don't Have any Complaints, but..."]

[Text] On March 28, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA published Reserve Colonel I. Semenov's notice which asserted that Russian Reserve Officers' Union Collegium Chairman—Chief of the Main Staff Reserve Major-General F. Khalturin requested that he be relieved for health reasons. To put it mildly, this information does not correspond to reality. I have never asked anyone to relieve me of the "post I held". And thank God my health is excellent.

The atmosphere of ill will created by former Main Political Directorate generals, the struggle for power, and the attempt to change the political and moral orientation of the Russian Reserve Officers' Union served as the real reasons for the "palace coup" that was inspired by these same former Main Political Directorate generals.

I do not have any complaints against the editorial staff. I understand that it was deceived by the author... Something else has distressed me. I worked at KRSNAYA ZVEZDA for 30 years and quite a few of my fellow servicemen are still in the editorial office's ranks today. Did this note really not trouble anyone: What happened to our colleague? Has he really become ill?

Draft Regulations of Officers' Assembly

*92UM0988A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 92 First edition p 2*

[Draft Regulations of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Officers' Coordinating Council Presidium: "CIS Joint Armed Forces Officers' Assembly Draft Regulations"]

[Text]

1. General Provisions

1. The Officers' Assembly is a standing organ of public individual initiative of officers in the Armed Forces. It independently determines the forms and methods of its work for realizing the principles of democratization of official military relations and social justice in military units (on ships) (Hereinafter referred to as military units). These principles assume the implementation and consolidation of one-man command on a legal and democratic basis in the Armed Forces.

The work of the Officers' Assembly is carried out in an atmosphere of broad glasnost and good will that facilitate an open exchange of opinions and ensure mutual responsibility and respect in all mutual relations among officers.

The Officers' Assembly is called upon to promote in every possible way: the cultivation of a feeling of honor and dignity among officers, general and military culture, and morality and ethics; the realization of the social and spiritual needs of officers; the development of creative association; rallying officer collectives; the increase of the aggressiveness of officers in performing their military duties and carrying out tasks assigned to military units; and, ensuring the social protection of officers and their families.

While considering the specific nature of the activities of military units, the Officers' Assembly, when necessary, can develop and approve, at an Officers' Assembly general membership meeting, the rules that regulate the activities of the military unit Officers' Assembly that correspond to the goals and principles contained in this Regulation.

2. Officers' assemblies are being created at all units from separate battalions (artillery battalions) to regiments and equivalent units up to the military district, fleet, and group of forces, including military educational institutions, institutions and organizations of the Armed Forces.

The principle of democratic centralism is the organizational basis of interrelations of the Officers' Assemblies of various levels.

The All-Army Officers' Assembly of the Armed Forces is the highest organ of the Officers' Assemblies.

3. At each military unit, a ritual for accepting officers into the Officers' Assembly on a voluntary basis is being developed and it is being carried out at an Officers' Assembly general membership meeting.

Officers of separate subunits that are deployed outside their unit area can participate as members of the Officers' Assemblies of the nearest units, regardless of their subordination.

Officers who are in the reserve or who are retired can personally participate in military unit Officers' Assemblies. Reserve officers and retirees can form a veterans section to solve their problem issues.

Officers, who are assigned to military units for an extended period of time on a temporary duty basis, can be granted the right, based on an Officers' Assembly decision, to participate in all activities conducted by the Officers' Assemblies as non-voting members.

Graduate school cadets can be invited, as non-voting members, to activities conducted by military educational institution general officers meetings.

The following guests may be invited to Officers' Assembly-conducted activities based upon an Officers' Assembly decision: officers who are not assembly members; army and naval warrant officers; military educational institution students and cadets; extended service military personnel; officers' family members; military unit workers and employees; representatives of local organs of power and rule and public organizations, etc.

4. An officers' assembly organizes and conducts its work, as a rule, based on the Officers' Club, in those locations where there is none—in facilities that are equipped with the required equipment and communications systems that are specially allocated by the command authorities. When necessary, facilities, motor vehicles, and other material assets may be rented or leased in the prescribed manner.

The officers' assembly is a juridical person according to the laws of the Russian Federation and other Commonwealth states and has a press, independent balance, current and other accounts in the appropriate banks.

Officers' Assembly membership dues may be used to create a monetary fund, based on an Officers' Assembly decision.

An Officers' Assembly general membership meeting determines the amount of dues and the procedures for collecting them, and also the validity of the utilization, safekeeping and accountability of the expenditure of monetary assets.

The Officers' Assembly Council has the right to control monetary assets.

An auditing commission is elected at a general membership meeting to monitor the validity of the expenditure of Officers' Assembly monetary assets.

5. The Officers' Assembly general membership meeting is the highest Officers' Assembly organ and it is conducted when necessary but no less than three times per year or upon demand of one-third of Officers' Assembly members and is competent if no less than half of its members are present. The course of Officers' Assembly general membership meetings and the decisions adopted are contained in the protocol. A general membership

meeting decision is the last level of authority for the examination of issues that are within the Officers' Assembly's jurisdiction.

Delegate Officers' Assemblies are conducted at a military unit (subunit) that is deployed at various garrisons, and at division-sized and larger units of the Armed Forces. The frequency for conducting them and the number of delegates are determined by the appropriate Officers' Assembly Council.

Payment for the travel of delegates to a meeting is carried out using monetary assets that have been allocated to military unit commanders for the payment of official temporary duty assignments.

6. An Officers' Assembly general membership meeting (a Delegate Officers' Assembly) elects an Officers' Assembly Council for a two-year term via secret ballot on an alternative basis to conduct current work, which includes the Officers' Assembly chairman and his deputy. The general membership meeting also determines the number of people elected to the council.

An officer is considered to be elected if he has received the greatest number of votes during the election, but no less than half the votes of the officers who participated in the general membership meeting. A general membership meeting can when necessary reelect the Officers' Assembly chairman, his deputy, or any Officers' Assembly Council member prior to the expiration of their powers upon representation of Officers' Assembly members of the appropriate level.

Officers' Assembly Council sessions are conducted when necessary but no less than once a month. Officers' Assembly non-voting members can participate in the discussion of any issue at a session.

Representatives of trade union organizations and the military unit women's council may become Officers' Assembly Council members according to an Officers' Assembly general membership meeting decision.

The following may be enlisted in the work of the Officers' Assembly Council: the chairman of a standing efficiency report board, and also representatives of other public organizations and commissions.

The CIS Joint Armed Forces, Border, Internal, and Railroad Troops and other military formations Officers' Assemblies Coordinating Council is the highest Officers' Assemblies executive organ. The tasks, functions, authority, and structure of the Coordinating Council are determined through a separate provision.

2. The Officers' Assembly's Tasks and Authority

7. The Officers' Assembly is tasked with:

—the education of officers in the spirit of selflessness to the Fatherland, patriotism and internationalism,

unselfish performance of military duty, high professionalism, discipline, initiative and creativity, love for subordinates and concern for them;

—the maintenance of friendly relations in the officers' collective based on observance of officer honor, respect for national dignity, and loyalty to one's own profession;

—the maintenance and increase of general and military culture of Officers' Assembly members and their mastery of the native and world military-historical legacies;

—ensuring the protection of officers from rudeness and arbitrariness, degradation of personal dignity, social injustice when resolving official issues, improvement of living conditions, everyday life and cultural servicing of officers and their family members;

—the examination of the issues for ensuring the resolution of tasks assigned to a military unit and formation of public opinion in the interests of their qualitative fulfillment; and,

—the examination of issues of performance of duty by officers:

a) formulation of recommendations to assign officers to the highest posts, assignment for studies at military educational institutions and rendering assistance to them in their preparation and matriculation for studies. These decisions are formulated by the protocol and are reflected in the submission to officers when materials are sent to the efficiency report board and personnel organ;

b) review of candidates for replacement and submission of proposals to the military unit command authorities while considering the order for the replacement of officers who are serving in the troops with prescribed terms of service and while considering the family situation of officers and the state of health of their family members, and while considering the service previously performed in various geographical regions with severe climactic conditions;

c) formulation of recommendations to the command authorities on the length of officers' next leaves, while proceeding from the realization of combat training plans and while considering the desires of officers on spending their time in sanatorium-resort (health) treatment and relaxation;

d) submission of proposals on submissions for conferring the next military rank to one level higher than the military rank prescribed for the authorized position occupied and for the award of state awards and also for conferring honorary titles while proceeding based on an officer's moral image and personal achievements in the service. Officers, whose nominations were not discussed at the Officers' Assembly on the questions of their awards and conferring rank, are not submitted to the efficiency report board;

e) discussion of the proposals on extending periods on active military service for officers in accordance with this law based on personnel organ proposals or on the personal initiative of officers and decisions made by them;

f) the organization and conduct of celebrations for officers as a result of successes achieved in official activities, presentation of state awards, conferring honorary and military rank, promotion in position, and also in the event of acceptance as Officers' Assembly members, memorable events in the family life of officers, and solemn send-off's for Officers' Assembly members to new duty locations or into the reserve or retirement.

8. The Officers' Assembly cultivates the culture of organizing one's own everyday life among officers, promotes a healthy life style, and, jointly with the command authority, resolves issues of material-everyday life, medical and sales support of officers and their family members.

9. The Officers' Assembly takes steps to instill a love for nature and the protection of the environment in officers and their family members. It, jointly with the command authority, organizes leisure time, cultural-enlightenment activities and other forms of collective relaxation for officers, their family members and guests, also a celebration on the military unit's anniversary. Friendly dinners, meetings and evenings of relaxation can be conducted while considering the desires of Officers' Assembly members.

Officers' Assembly members participate in the creation and improvement of the facilities of cultural-enlightenment institutions, sports facilities, and other locations of organized relaxation for officers and their family members. They can contribute literary works and works of art, personal works of amateur creative activity, collections, etc., to the Officers' Assembly cultural fund on a voluntary basis.

3. The Officers' Assembly General Membership Meeting

10. The tasks of the Officers' Assembly General Membership Meeting are:

- to examine, discuss, and make decisions on issues that are associated with the resolution of all tasks assigned to the Officers' Assembly in Articles 7-9; and,
- to listen to any military unit officer, regardless of the position or military rank he holds, who is a member of this Officers' Assembly and also to the leaders of various commissions on issues that are of interest to officers. Recommendations, which are submitted to the appropriate commanders and chiefs, are developed based on the results of the hearing.

11. The Officers' Assembly General Membership Meeting, at its own initiative or at the initiative of its council, and also at the initiative of its individual members, is authorized to examine:

- conflict situations among officers;
- cases of insults and tactless behavior of officers;
- cases of undermining the authority and personal dignity of an officer;
- negative situations (conceit, arrogance, haughtiness, rudeness, toadyism, servility, and others);
- cases of officers' abuse of their official positions;
- cases of a callous attitude toward their official duties;
- cases of the violation of military discipline and officers' ethics;
- cases of the manifestation of social injustice with regard to officers;
- cases of dishonorable conduct of officers on duty, in the family, in public places, and also other issues.

12. Through an Officers' Assembly decision, the following measures of public influence can be applied to officers for committing those deeds:

- friendly criticism;
- a friendly warning;
- officer's censure;
- pronouncement of a decision on lodging a public apology by an officer, who has committed some deed or other, to the Officers' Assembly and to the individual who has been insulted;
- exclusion from Officers' Assembly membership for a period determined by a decision of the Officers' Assembly; or,
- expression of no confidence to an officer with the filing of a petition to the command authority on his reassignment or release from active military service. This Officers' Assembly opinion is reflected in the officer's efficiency rating.

13. Discussion of the issues submitted at the general membership meeting is conducted under conditions of glasnost, friendly criticism, and self-criticism. Each officer has the right to speak to the point of the issues being discussed and, in so doing, no activities whatsoever are permitted that are directed at suppressing criticism or restricting freedom of speech.

Officers' Assembly general membership meeting decisions are made by a show of hands and are considered adopted if more than half of those present at the meeting have voted for them. At the demand of more than half of the Officers' Assembly members present, decisions can be made via secret ballot.

Officers' Assembly general membership meeting decisions on issues that are within the competence of the Officers' Assembly are binding for all of its members. They are disseminated to all military unit officers—to the affected party—and to the rest of the military unit personnel.

Military unit commanders consider the Officers' Assembly's opinions and take steps to implement them.

In the event of nonconcurrence with an Officers' Assembly decision, the military unit commander petitions the Officers' Assembly Council on a repeat examination of the issue.

For the resolutions of contradictions that have arisen with the unit command authority, the Officers' Assembly Council can appeal to a higher commander or to a higher level Officers' Assembly Council.

4. The Officers' Assembly Council

14. The tasks of the Officers' Assembly Council are:

—to examine, discuss, and make decisions on issues that are associated:

a) with the implementation of decisions of the Officers' Assembly general membership meeting of units and higher Delegates Officers' Assemblies;

b) with the organization of the execution of tasks that have been assigned to the Officers' Assembly and which are being carried out by the military unit as a whole and also with the implementation of initiative proposals and appeals of officers;

—to prepare an Officers' Assembly general membership meeting; and,

—to listen to any military unit officer who is a member of this Officers' Assembly and also to the leaders of various social commissions on issues that are of interest to officers.

15. The Officers' Assembly Council, at its own initiative or at the initiative of individual members of the Council or Officers' Assembly is obligated:

—to examine and prepare issues that are subject to discussion at the Officers' Assembly general membership meeting and also implement and carry out monitoring of the execution of decisions made by the general membership meeting;

—to conduct individual work with Officers' Assembly members, to invite officers to council sessions where their opinions and proposals are heard: on conflict situations among officers; on cases when an officer has been insulted or of tactless behavior of officers; on cases of undermining the authority and personal dignity of an officer; on officers' negative acts (conceit, arrogance, haughtiness, rudeness, toadyism, servility, and others); on cases of officers' abuse of their official positions; on cases of the violation of military discipline and officers' ethics; on cases of the manifestation of social injustice with regard to officers; on cases of the dishonorable conduct of officers on duty, in the family, in public places, and also on other issues;

—to promote the eradication of cases of bureaucracy, infringement upon the legal rights of officers, and unsubstantiated accusations of official omissions against them;

—to conduct work on the mobilization of officers for increasing their professional training;

—at their sessions, examine letters, statements, and proposals which are addressed to the Officers' Assembly and carry out reception of officers on personal issues;

—to participate in monitoring the work of military sales institutions, mess halls, and other everyday services facilities that service this military unit for the purpose of improving support conditions for officers and their family members;

—to participate in the resolution of issues on granting trip passes to officers and their family members for treatment at sanatoriums, out-patient clinics, rest homes, resort hotels, and for relaxation at tourist facilities, etc.;

—to examine, jointly with the military unit women's council, the issue of the state of morale and the moral atmosphere in officers' families, to plan and discuss steps associated with improving work with officers' children, to render assistance in work with parents' committees and teaching collectives of general education schools in the education of students who are children of servicemen, to visit officers' dormitories and officers' families, and to be interested in their lives and lifestyles;

—to enlist officers for participation in providing public service and amenities to apartment buildings, the grounds of military garrisons, sports fields and children's playgrounds;

—to determine and discuss, jointly with the administration of cultural-enlightenment institutions of military units (garrisons), steps to improve cultural servicing and esthetic and ethical education of officers and their family members; and,

—to organize committees (working groups) in their own structure to carry out tasks assigned to the Officers' Assembly and to its Council.

16. The Officers' Assembly Council makes decisions by a show of hands. A decision is considered adopted if no less than half of the Council members present at the session have voted for it.

Council decisions that require their approval at an Officers' Assembly general membership meeting are submitted for discussion of the next general membership meeting but no later than 15 days from the moment of their adoption at a Council session.

17. At each next session, the Council informs the general membership meeting about its work and steps to carry out decisions of the preceding session, the implementation of proposals, and critical remarks expressed at it by officers, the fulfillment of its decisions, and also about the reaction of officers with regard to whom steps of public influence were taken.

Upon expiration of the term of its authority, the Officers' Assembly Council reports on the work it has done to an Officers' Assembly general membership meeting.

5. The Rights and Obligations of the Officers' Assembly Chairman, his Deputy, and Officers' Assembly Members.

18. The Officers' Assembly Chairman is responsible only to the Officers' Assembly and carries out his work in accordance with the decisions made at the Officers' Assembly general membership meeting and at its Council sessions. He conducts correspondence on behalf of the Officers' Assembly and is a member of the unit efficiency report board.

The Officers' Assembly Chairman is responsible for organizing the work of the Officers' Assembly and its Council for the purpose of carrying out tasks assigned to the Officers' Assembly.

The Officers' Assembly Chairman is obliged:

- to develop the Officers' Assembly's work plans and to approve them at Council sessions;
- to organize training and conduct Officers' Assembly Council sessions;
- to conduct, jointly with the deputy and the Council members, purposeful work to implement decisions made at Officers' Assembly general membership meetings and Council sessions and to insure their unconditional fulfillment by all Officers' Assembly members;
- to ensure the conduct of measures at the Officers' Assembly;
- to conduct the reception of visitors—members of the Officers' Assembly and their family members who are appealing to him on personal matters;
- to conduct individual conversations with Officers' Assembly members on their needs and desires;
- to establish and constantly support cooperation with other public organizations and with the local authorities;
- to constantly delve into and participate in the resolution of issues of material, commercial-consumer, medical and cultural servicing of officers and their family members;
- to develop, jointly with Council members, estimates of receipts and expenditures of the Officers' Assembly monetary fund and to monitor the validity of its expenditure; and,
- to deliver an accounting on Officers' Assembly Council work performed to Officers' Assembly members no less than once every six months.

The Officers' Assembly Chairman has the right:

—to raise to the command authority issues on social protection of officers and their family members and on observance of the principle of social justice in the solution of issues of officer duty performance and personnel issues;

—to conduct, when necessary, an unplanned Officers' Assembly Council session or a unit Officers' Assembly general membership meeting;

—to assign tasks to Council members and Officers' Assembly members to carry out decisions made at general membership meetings and Council sessions and also on organizing activities conducted at the Officers' Assembly; and,

—to appeal to an official to whom the unit commander is subordinate or to a higher level Officers' Assembly Council in the event contradictions arise between the unit commander and Officers' Assembly members.

19. The Officers' Assembly Deputy Chairman organizes his work with regard to the chairman's obligations and rights and, in his absence—is totally guided by them.

20. An Officers' Assembly member is responsible for all possible assistance to the Council and Officers' Assembly in the implementation of tasks assigned to them and also for the implementation of decisions made by the Officers' Assembly and its Council. He is obligated:

- to value his membership in the Officers' Assembly and to strengthen and support its prestige in every possible way;
- to participate in all measures being conducted in the Officers' Assembly and to carry out its decisions and the tasks of the Officers' Assembly Council;
- to promote in every possible way the creation of an atmosphere, in the officers' collective, of mutual respect, comradeship, a caring attitude toward the prestige of each officer, respect for seniors, and closeness to his subordinates and concern for them;
- to render assistance to the command authority and to the Officers' Assembly Council to strengthen collectivism, comradeship, and mutual assistance among officers and their family members and in eradicating negative phenomena in the officer environment;
- to ceaselessly work on increasing his professional and legal knowledge and on expanding his common world view; and,
- to be constantly concerned about the creation of a strong and healthy family, about the education of children, and also to render assistance to teachers' collectives and parents' committees of general education schools in training and teaching school children.

An Officers' Assembly member has the right:

- to express his opinion and to criticize any Officers' Assembly member for shortcomings or omissions in service and in personal conduct. In the event of suppression of criticism or persecution for it, submit a written statement to the Officers' Assembly Council;
- to appeal to the Officers' Assembly Council or directly at a meeting with oral or written statements, complaints on personal issues, and also in cases of someone being held materially responsible or of being disciplined based on unsubstantiated charges;
- in the event of an insult or degradation of the honor and dignity of an officer, appeal to the Officers' Assembly Council for protection;
- to participate in all Officers' Assembly Council sessions regardless of the content of the issues being examined with the right of a non-voting member; and,
- to invite his parents, relatives, friends and acquaintances to cultural- enlightenment activities being conducted with the permission of the Officers' Assembly Council.

[Signed] CIS Joint Armed Forces Officers' Assembly Coordinating Council Presidium

CIS: POLICY

Interview With Chief of Humanitarian Academy

92UM0990A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 May 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Rear Adm Ivan Barsukov, professor, deputy chief for academic and scientific work at the Humanitarian Academy of the Armed Forces, by Capt 3rd Rank A. Pelts: "Our Diploma Must Be Convertible"]

[Text] Rear Adm Ivan Barsukov, professor, deputy chief for academic and scientific work at the Humanitarian Academy of the Armed Forces, believes that our diploma must be made convertible.

[Pelts] Ivan Ivanovich, it is well known that the academy is going through a difficult period. It is simply not needed in its previous form. What changes are being made today?

[Barsukov] These are indeed not easy times for us. We are effecting a profound reform of the academy on the move, so to speak, without disrupting the academic process. This is extremely difficult, but it is essential. It is not just a matter of changing the signs. It involves altering the very purpose of the academy, its makeup, and the rethinking of requirements set for the graduates.

New specialists are needed to work with the personnel within the new structures. The academy also has to perform its assigned job of contributing to the reorganization of the existing system of instruction in the army and navy.

[Pelts] Any reorganization, particularly such an in-depth one, always entails some losses. What are you giving up?

[Barsukov] The most substantial changes were made in the social science department. This was due primarily to the increased role assigned to general pedagogical, psychological, legal and methodological preparation of the students.

With respect to losses.... Training by correspondence was eliminated entirely. Beginning this year no more applicants are being accepted for this department. We dropped the military-political course back in September of 1991. What replaced it? The time made available from this was allocated for special courses in military psychology, sociology, management of social processes, and culture. Major adjustments have subsequently been made almost monthly in such disciplines as our country's history, political movements of the modern era, economic theories and studies, law and political science.

I want to stress one important thing. The academy has set out on a course of training the specialist in his field of knowledge. For this purpose we have worked out subject plans and training programs which measure up to the contemporary level of development of the social sciences and the humanities, military and natural technical sciences, and the state and international requirements set for specialists. We plan to enlist in the training process prominent scholars and scientists from civilian and military VUZs, as well as workers in the cultural area and from scientific research, religious, public and other institutions, including foreign institutions. Based on this, we have a right to say that our graduates will be real professionals.

[Pelts] Also in the military field?

[Barsukov] You have touched upon a very important issue. Some people have the opinion that, due to the general democratization of life in the armed forces, the humanizing of military-service relations and the change in the functional duties of deputy commanders for personnel work, the military training of students is no longer so important. I believe that this is an erroneous approach. We firmly declare that our graduates will have a higher military education.

I want to add to this the fact that, as the man in charge, the deputy commander for personnel work must be up to par in all respects. This includes the organization of combat training.

[Pelts] But will the students who have already entered the Military-Political Academy be able to accept these changes?

[Barsukov] They are encouraging the changes themselves. As a former student myself, I can frankly say that this group of people has always had a wholesome, fairly critical, even "rebel-student," one might say, attitude toward everything they study. And so there are no problems here.

For our part, we are doing everything possible to encourage their desire to acquire a socially useful specialty and giving them broad opportunities to select precisely the field which the students themselves are interested in as a second specialty. Incidentally, this was not the case in the past.

[Pelts] What kind of diplomas will the graduates receive?

[Barsukov] This year the graduates are already receiving the new diplomas with these qualifications: social pedagog, psychologist, practical psychologist, sociologist, instructor of social sciences, editor of press, radio and television. These are the main specialties which we—the academy's command element, professors and instructors, and students—are mastering together in the course of the reform. The training of cultural specialists, professional military specialists and political-legal experts is to start up with the new academic year.

I would add that an important place within the system for retraining personnel to use the new structures will be assigned to 10-month courses for diplomas in the new skills categories of sociologist, psychologist and specialist in information and public communication in the department for advanced training and retraining of personnel. In addition, we shall continue the training of scientific-academic personnel as full-time and correspondence advanced students, the doctoral candidate program and the institution of senior scientific associate, as well as the competitive program for an academic degree.

And so, the academy, which has a solid scientific capability, is to become the center of basic military-scientific research in the area of the social sciences. We have everything we need to achieve this new status. And, I am confident, we can apply it to see that the diploma of a graduate of our academy is convertible, to use the word in vogue right now. At both the state and the international level. These are our tasks.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Evacuation of Military Families from Azerbaijan Begins

92UM1008A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
No 78, 22 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Igor Yermakov: "Time to Go Home"]

[Text] Evacuation from Azerbaijan of dependents of men serving in the Transcaucasus formation of the PVO [Air Defense] Troops has been initiated. According to information provided by General Popov, Ministry of Defense PVO deputy chief of staff, troop authorities decided to lend some assistance to persons wishing to leave the danger area.

The evacuees claim that the main reason for their wishing to depart is the intolerable situation, which is incompatible with normal living. Many military posts

are blocked in, with normal deliveries of food supplies impeded; it is virtually impossible to find employment.

The presence of the dependents renders the situation even more difficult for the servicemen. This holds true in both the psychological aspect, whereby the men suffer constant concern for security of their families, and in the material aspect, relative to the need to provide forces to guard the posts. In this connection, the evacuation organizers point out that the very process of transporting the dependents is not without its hazards. The only possible method is by air, but travel on the roads to military airfields is associated with considerable risk. Military vehicles are often subjected to delays and searches, in many cases simply forced to turn back. As a consequence, it is necessary to seek means of transportation which do not attract attention. In addition, the capabilities of the military aircraft are limited, necessitating abandonment of some personal property.

Presently leaving the republic are largely families who have a place to stay, such as with relatives or friends. In this regard, Ukraine has in the past refused entry to aircraft carrying persons who have lived on Ukraine territory or who have relatives there. Military dependents who have no opportunity to find even temporary living quarters beyond the borders of Azerbaijan have no recourse but to remain and hope for the best.

Impact of Money Shortages on Antiaircraft Unit

92UM1001A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 May 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Goryavin, North Caucasus Military District: "Financial Dead Ends: Even Missilemen Can't Find Their Way Out of Them Today"]

[Text] When I spent some time in a surface-to-air missile brigade six years ago, I was unable to restrain my joy upon seeing how alert duty was organized there. I was pleased by the neatness and exemplary order at the military post, and by the combat training, which was not only organized well, but also carried out well.

That's the way things were. But what is the brigade's life like today?

Adding all of my impressions together, I would say very poor. Last year, brigade deputy commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Batishchev said, the unit received 40 percent of the money it was supposed to. And today, not a single kopeck has been transferred to its account. There is even no money to pay for electric power from the regional power suppliers. In comparison with last year, the cost of a kilowatt-hour jumped almost 15 times—from 5.6 kopecks to 86 kopecks. Local "energy merchants" have been sending protest notes to the unit, demanding payment of its old and new debts, and sometimes they simply shut off the current.

One of the battalions was cut clean off, so that now it is forced to constantly operate its diesel generators

intended for wartime. But fuel oil is now worth almost its weight in gold. And there are interruptions even in its supply, by the way. Recently the local administration gave instructions to debit the brigade's bank account by half a million rubles that had been transferred to cover the pay of the personnel.

There is no money for anything. The need for sending equipment out for repairs is more than urgent, but the cost of a single rail flatcar has risen from R200 to R15,000. While it did not cost anything before to load vehicles and machine units at the ramp, today railroaders have proclaimed it a "tourist attraction" and are demanding 5 rubles for every ton of cargo from the brigade. And the weight of each equipment unit is 15-20 tons.

Organs financing the unit have not reacted in any way to this unimaginable growth in prices. Moreover they even failed to subsidize the brigade's planned expenditures based on the former low rates applicable to all budget items.

I was told at headquarters that five of the surface-to-air complexes had been dropped to the lowest fitness category, and that they could no longer be repaired. Before, they used to be sent to Derbent and Sumgait, which are now in a different country. The headquarters gave orders to send the scrapped equipment to a certain city in the Moscow area. But this requires R750,000, which the brigade doesn't have. Still, the pressure continues from above: Send that equipment off! Does this mean that there is no way out? Who is to say?

It is fully within the means of the unit's specialists to dismantle the stations on site: Some things could be junked, while others could be cannibalized for spare parts. Components containing precious metals could be sold. Kungi [small huts] (around 40 of them have accumulated) could be sold to officers and warrant officers of the brigade who have started garden plots: There are more people than you can imagine wishing to acquire a prefabricated shed at a suitable price.

Sixty percent of the reconnaissance stations (they are the ones that monitor the piece of the air border "cut" for the brigade) are long overdue for medium repairs and overhaul. But not one of them has even been included in the repair plan in the last four years.

Back in 1989 four power plants were sent to the repair plant in Gotvald, Kharkov Oblast, and money to repair the machine units was transferred right away. The diesel generators disappeared without a trace. The Ukrainian government imposed a total prohibition on deliveries of military equipment. The generators could be "forced out" of the plant, but they would be detained at the customs station.

A similar situation also evolved with electronic tubes, without which combat control of the battalions would be fundamentally impossible. They used to be manufactured by a certain defense enterprise in Rostov-on-Don,

and there were no special replacement problems. But the plant switched to production of modern electronic components, and these tubes became as rare as the ancient mammoth. Some are still in the storage depots, but the storage depots and all of their contents have been transferred to the control of Azerbaijan. Any time now the radio relay stations will "fall silent," and the future of alert duty will be very much in doubt.

They know about this in the next two higher levels of organization, but there is nothing they can do. Everything hangs on a thread—tubes are a small problem in comparison. Judge for yourself how life is for "soldiers on the first line" in our times.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

V-Adm Stalbo: Russia and Crimea

92UM0962A Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (Signed to press 2 Mar 92)
pp 14-17

[Article by Doctor of Naval Sciences, Professor, Vice-Admiral (Retired) K. Stalbo: "Russia and Crimea"]

[Text] Since ancient times, the Crimea has been an arena of battle for possession of it among many states of Southern Europe and Southwest Asia. The following peoples have inhabited the Crimea: Cimmerians, Avars, Scythians, Alans, Khazars, Sarmatians, Goths, Huns, Pechenegs, Greeks, Byzantines, Armenians, Romans, Russians, Tatars, and once again Russians. You can encounter something similar in only a few places.

Since the 10th Century, the eastern portion of Crimea has been part of the Russian Tmutarakan [Tmutorokan] Principality which arose on the Taman Peninsula with the capital of Tmutarakan (Taman) during the times of the expeditions of Prince Igor by Byzantium and Svyatoslav to the Iasians [Ossetians] and Kosogians. In the 12th Century, when the Mongol-Tatars invaded the Crimea and created the Crimean Ulus of the Golden Horde here, this principality ceased to exist. Later, after the breakup of the Golden Horde, the Crimean Khanate was formed in place of the Ulus which was seized by Turkey and transformed by it into its vassal.

The Crimean Khanate possessed vast territories. In the west, its borders reached the left bank of the Dnepr at its lower current and, in the east—to the right bank of the Kuban. The peninsula was just one third of this territory.

The Crimean Khans, properly and obediently carrying out the commands of the Turkish Sultan, were the unflinching instrument of the Ottoman Empire's systematic aggressive actions against the Slavs. The Crimean Horde reached Moscow, Tula, Ryazan, and Serpukhov. Ivan the Terrible's regiments fought them off with difficulty at Moscow's very walls and the Tatars captured and burned down Moscow in 1571. More than 200,000

prisoners were led away to the Crimea just in the first third of the 17th Century. (Large Soviet Encyclopedia, Volume 13, p. 517).

In his novel "Slovo i delo" [Word and Deed], Valentin Savvich Pikul wrote: "For four centuries, the Crimean Khanate deprived Rus of a population numbering nearly 5,000,000 people." There is hardly any basis to doubt this figure.

That is how they lived for centuries. At that time, Russians, Poles and Ukrainians walked on Crimean land only as prisoners. And later slave markets and the lot of slaves were in the Crimea, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, on Malta, and on French and Spanish galleys. In his notes, Cervantes recalls his encounter with Russian slaves behind an oar on an Algerian galley.

Over the course of several centuries, the problem of defense from the incursions of the Crimean Khans was one of the most critical problems for Russia, Poland and Ukraine and one could have expected an alliance of these peoples who were equally interested in eliminating the horrible threat from the south. However, this did not occur. Neither Poland nor Ukraine supported all, except one, of Russia's attempts to subdue the enemy.

Ivan IV (1556-1559) and Aleksey Mikhaylovich (1662-1669) each undertook two unsuccessful expeditions against the Crimea. The incursions of the Crimean Tatars onto southern Russian lands usually became more frequent in the periods when Russia was waging wars in the north. So, during the time of the Livonian War (1558-1583), they attacked Rus 21 times. The Turkish-Crimean aggression acquired an especially broad scope during the Polish and Swedish interventions.

Two new expeditions into the Crimea (1687 and 1689) were undertaken by the ukase of the ruler of Sophia, however both Crimean campaigns at that time turned out to be unsuccessful.

Several years later, Peter I, while carrying out his plan to guarantee Russia's access to the sea and the defense of the country's southern regions from devastating incursions, conducted two expeditions for this purpose and, in 1696, captured a key Turkish outpost—Azov Castle, having forced the first breach in the system of Turkish forward fortifications on Russia's southern borders. The Russian Regular Navy played a decisive role in the victory over the enemy in the course of the struggle for Azov.

In accordance with the armistice signed in Constantinople in 1700, Russia received Azov, obtained the right of navigation in the Sea of Azov which had been an internal sea of the Crimean Khanate prior to this, and freed itself from the humiliating annual payment of tribute to Bakhchisaray.

The Boyar Duma Ukase, "Morskim sudam byt" [There Will be Maritime Vessels], was issued on 20 October

1696, as a result of the Azov Campaign. This date is considered to be the birth date of Russia's Regular Navy, the 300th Anniversary of which we will commemorate in October 1996. Thus, the beginning of the creation of the Russian Navy is associated with Peter I's "cause" against the Crimean Khanate.

Initiation of construction of the Azov Fleet's base—Taganrog—began after the capture of Azov. However, Turkey, imparting great significance to the integrity of its borders in the north and while taking advantage of the Russian Army's reverses in Moldavia in 1711, regained its Azov losses through the Treaty of Pruth. In the future, the struggle for the Crimea shifted into the channel of the Russo-Turkish wars that at times had the nature of a coalition. There were three such wars.

After the Moldavian "embarrassment", and especially after the death of Peter I, the Crimean Khans, spurred on by Turkey, intensified their aggressive operations against the south of Russia. As a result, the task of localizing the predatory incursions of the Tatars once again arose with all of its criticality. This problem, which had always been important, now acquired primary significance in Russia's foreign policy. The Russian Government understood that it needed to seize the Crimean Peninsula and the flanking Turkish-Tatar strongholds of Azov, Ochakov, and Kinburn for a fundamental solution of the task. Russia's ever increasing requirements to acquire access to the southern seas were a very important factor that determined precisely this approach. St. Petersburg prepared itself for war. Istanbul, and its vassal—Bakhchisaray, also conducted preparations for it.

Russia entered into a military alliance with Austria and secured Persia's agreement not to conclude a peace with Turkey, against which Persia was fighting at that time. For this, Russia returned to Shah Nadir the Caspian lowlands Russia had seized from him in 1722.

Khan Kaplan-Girey's expedition across Russian lands to the Caucasus served as grounds for the new war of 1735-1739. In 1736, the Dnepr Army, under the command of Field Marshal Minikh, breached the defenses of the Crimean Tatars at Perekop and, having repulsed numerous counterattacks, gained access to Crimea's broad steppes, reached Gezlev (Yevpatoriya) and seized Bakhchisaray several days later. It seemed that the task had been carried out but, the lack of food, an epidemic and the loss of horses compelled Minikh to leave the Crimea. However, by that time, General Leontyev had captured Kinburn and Field Marshal Lassi's Don Army seized Azov while supported by Rear-Admiral Senyavin's Don Flotilla. After that, in 1737 and 1738 Lassi, using the flotilla's ships, broke through to the Crimea twice through the Arabatskiy Estuary and Sivash while skirting Perekop. In a series of battles, Lassi defeated the allied Turkish-Crimean troops but, he was once again forced to abandon the Crimea due to a shortage of food and forage and an epidemic.

So, during the course of that war, Russian troops broke through onto the territory of the Crimea three times but they could not conquer the Khanate. At that time, their success was limited just to the seizure of their enemies' flanking strongholds—Azov, Ochakov, and Kinburn. The war ended with the signing of a peace treaty in Belgrade in 1740, through which Ochakov was returned to Turkey and Azov's fortifications were destroyed. Russia obtained the right to build a fortress on the Island of Cherkas on Don. Russia was prohibited from having a fleet on the Black Sea or on the Sea of Azov or to use its own ships for trade. Such severe terms for Russia were determined by the major failures of its ally—Austria—on the main—western sector of the theater of war.

So, Russia's ninth attempt to secure the south of the state from incursions ended unsuccessfully.

A further deterioration of interstate relations resulted in the creation of new coalitions. Austria and France supported Turkey. Russia concluded a treaty of alliance with Prussia and Denmark. In the next Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774, General Dolgorukov's troops breached the enemy defense in 1771 after long and stubborn battles. Perekop fell and Gezlev, Kafa and Bakhchisaray followed after it. Furthermore, ships from Vice-Admiral Senyavin's Azov Flotilla landed General Sherbatov's troops in the area of Genich (Genichesk) and the troops later occupied Kerch. The Crimean Khan Sakhb-Girey capitulated on November 1, 1772.

Finally, Russia managed to solve a problem of state importance which it had faced for many centuries. Crimea was proclaimed independent from Turkey and accepted Russian protection. We received the right to have a fleet on the Black Sea and to pass through the Black Sea straits. All of this was determined by the Peace Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarji.

On April 9, 1783, Catherine II proclaimed through a manifesto the annexation of Crimea and Taman to Russia. Sevastopol was founded in that year and many spheres of Crimean life were subordinated to its existence and development. In 1784, Crimea became a part of Tavricheskiy Oblast (since 1787—a province) with its center at Simferopol. However, Turkey could not reconcile itself to this loss or to the appearance of the Russian Fleet on the Black Sea. This resulted in a new war in which Russia entered into an alliance with Austria. England, France, and Prussia clandestinely supported Turkey. In August 1787, Turkey delivered an ultimatum to Russia with a demand to return the Crimea and to recognize Georgia as a vassal possession of the sultan and to agree to the establishment of Turkish control over Russian ships during their passage through the straits. The Russian Government responded with a refusal. This served as grounds for a new war.

Ground troop combat operations on the Crimean axis were restricted to the seizure of Ochakov and Kinburn and also to the defense of Crimea. The main combat

operations associated with holding Crimea were conducted on the Black Sea where the Turkish Fleet had numerical superiority over the Russians (4:1 in battle-ships and frigates). The enemy planned a maritime assault landing in Crimea but encountered serious resistance from the Black Sea Fleet, a squadron of which under the command of Admiral Ushakov routed Kapudan-Pasha's fleet in a series of naval battles. The estuary (Dnepr) flotilla also operated successfully. It rendered assistance to General Suvorov's troops in the destruction of a 5,000 man Turkish assault force which the Turks managed to land on a spit of land at Kinburn.

The following engagements and battles at sea entered into history from the experience of this war: at Fidonisi Island on July 3, 1788; at the Strait of Kerch on July 8, 1790; at Tendra on August 28, 1790, and at Mys Kaliakra [Nos Kaliakra, Bulgaria] on July 31, 1791.

F.F. Ushakov's victories disrupted all of Turkey's plans to attack Crimea from the sea. They facilitated, along with the successes of the Russian Army, the acceleration of negotiations and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Jassy in accordance with which Turkey transferred the Crimea, Ochakov, Kinburn, and Azov to Russia for all time.

From 1797 to 1802, Crimea was part of Novorossiysk Province from which it was separated into a separate province. Its southern coast began to be used as a resort in the second half of the 19th century.

After October 1917, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Tavrida was formed in the Crimea which was part of the RSFSR. But as a result of the occupation of the Crimea by German troops, it existed for a total of two months.

On October 18, 1920, the Crimean ASSR was formed as part of the RSFSR after the Red Army seizure of the Crimea. After the repressions which came down on the Crimean Tatars in May 1944, the republic was transformed into Crimea Oblast in June 1945 and it was unexpectedly transferred to the UkSSR in February 1954 after being part of Russia for nearly 200 years. We learned of this from N.S. Khrushchev's speech at the celebration of the 300th Anniversary of the unification of Ukraine with Russia. Later this transfer was formalized by a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase.

However, and we need to stress this, there is no paragraph in the 19 February 1954 ukase on the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine. It states only the following: "Approve the joint representation of the RSFSR and UkSSR Supreme Soviets on the transfer of Crimea Oblast to Ukraine." The joint representation has not been found in the open archives. There is a 5 February 1954 RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium representation and a 13 February 1954 UkSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium representation which it would be difficult to call joint. Both because they were adopted at different places and at different times and because they were adopted not at Supreme Soviet sessions but at Presidium sessions of these Soviets that did not have the authority to do that

and all the more so in the absence of a quorum (so, only 15 of the 26 members were present at the Russian Presidium session). Furthermore, the participants of the events of that time say that Khrushchev's announcement in Kiev about the Crimea was unexpected for the CPSU Central Committee and for the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The order about the preparation of the ukase, as they say, "post-facto", also followed just as unexpectedly from the celebration. And, consequently, the juridical force of these documents is in doubt.

Well, just what were the arguments that substantiate the need for the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine? One of them—is the commonality of the economy. But there is no such commonality. Ukraine was the "all-union stoker" and the "country's breadbasket". Crimea is the all-union health resort and the territory for basing the Black Sea Nuclear Missile Ocean Fleet which guarantees the defense of the state in the country's single naval forces system in the World Ocean and is also a tourist facility, including for foreigners. What kind of commonality of the economy can it be a question of?

One more argument is the territorial proximity of Ukraine and Crimea but it has been extracted from the reactionary theory of geopolitics that was condemned by the Nuremberg International Tribunal and the United Nations. Geopolitics was an important element of the doctrine of Fascism that propagated the idea of natural borders (borders that had not been formed historically), in accordance with which the idea of living space was developed.

And, finally, the third argument is the close economic and cultural ties between Crimea Oblast and the Ukrainian SSR. But, first of all, were they really closer at that time than, for example, the ties with Krasnodar Kray and, secondly, can such ties be grounds for the unification, more accurately, the absorption of a smaller territory by a larger territory?

Hasn't all of this served as the reason why the leadership of today's Ukraine has taken all of these steps to prevent the conduct of the referendum that is being planned in the Crimea with regard to determining its status (part of Ukraine, part of Russia, or complete independence). Indeed, can we not consider the results of the referendum as it was with the 17 March 1991 referendum when the "new realities" permitted them to totally ignore its results, but that would have added embarrassment for the leadership of Ukraine. The poll that was conducted instead of it which skirted the issue and provided the opportunity for political manipulation: do the residents of Ukraine want its independence provided the quite expected result—yes, they do! But no one asked the people whether Ukraine would remain in the union or the commonwealth with the other fraternal republics, enter into a confederation or federation with them, or totally secede, and therefore today the well-known result of that referendum provides the opportunity to various political groups to interpret the referendum in their own interests.

Therefore, it seems to me that the question of Crimea's status remains open. It needs to be resolved in a constitutional manner but not by the method of open confrontation which our people justifiably fear. The fate of the Black Sea Fleet has also turned out to be tied to Crimea. As we all know, the president of Ukraine placed his signature on the document at Minsk and that document assigned the Navy to the strategic deterrent forces. And Leonid Kravchuk's unexpected change of position on this issue is incomprehensible. Now he views the Black Sea Fleet as general purpose forces and he is undertaking an attempt to make it the property of Ukraine alone.

But the USSR Navy was created as a single integrated strategic system of naval weapons that is capable of resolving the issues of defense of the entire country from the sea and ocean axes. The Black Sea Ocean Fleet is a part of this single balanced system. Its command and control is only possible from the one center that is common for the entire Navy. The transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to the subordination of Ukraine will signify a break of the chain of our defense efforts on the Mediterranean and Iberian-Atlantic axes.

At the present time, the problems of defense from the ocean and sea axes are being resolved not just off our own shores, as it was during the Great Patriotic War, but in the World Ocean where the Western countries' navies' strategic strike task forces are deployed. The issues of the regime and maintenance of order (security of borders and combating smuggling) are being resolved off our shores.

The exclusion of the Black Sea Fleet from the country's single system of naval forces and its transfer to the jurisdiction of Ukraine will also signify the undermining of the Commonwealth's defense and the disruption of the parity that has developed in naval weapons in a certain part of the ocean theater.

These thoughts were also expressed at the All-Army Conference in Moscow on January 17, 1992. But the President of Ukraine called it unconstitutional and therefore, according to his "graphic" expression, the demands of its participants will have no greater significance for him than a lunar eclipse... It is symptomatic. These words of the champions of democratic, rule-of-law and civilized forms of state rule cause, putting it mildly, amazement.

While speaking on television on January 19, L. Kravchuk stressed one more thought that was reanimated from the evil past but that is currently being departed from. He said, we are moving along an unexplored path and here, of course, mistakes are possible. It is as if someone wants to thereby ensure himself indulgence from the defects of his political policy, dilettantism, nationalism, and the direct flaunting of the interests of all the peoples who populate our Commonwealth.

And in conclusion. The inclusion of Crimea as part of Russia would hardly have signified the colonization of this area. Rather the reverse. Crimea has always been a privileged part. It is with Russia's concerns that Crimea became not only a health resort but also an attractive place for our

national culture. The lives and creativity of Tolstoy, Pushkin, Chekhov, Gorkiy, Segeyev-Tsenskiy, Marina Tsvetayeva, Aleksandr Grin, Paustovskiy, Trenev, Voloshin, Ayvazovskiy, and Sokolov-Skali are tied to the Crimea. The names of Russia's prominent Military Leaders-Generalissimos Suvorov and Sheina, Field Marshals Rumyantsev, Potemkin, Kutuzov, Minikh, and Lassi, Admirals Lazarev, Ushakov, Kornilov, Nakhimov, Oktyabrskiy, Kuznetsov, and Gorshkov, and Marshals of the Soviet Union Vasilevskiy and Tolbukhin are also associated with Crimea's fate. The names of the Russian Tsars Ivan IV, Aleksey, and Peter I, and the Rulers Sophia, Anna, Elizabeth, Catherine II, and Aleksandr II are also associated with the struggle for the Crimea.

So, the Crimea is an historic territory that was part of Russia for more than two centuries. The problem of this territory that has arisen today must be resolved based on negotiations, a legal assessment of the acts that have determined its current status, and the expressed will of its population that has been expressed according to a precisely formulated and specific question. The confrontation that has been noted here must be overcome immediately because it can facilitate the avalanche-like buildup of similar processes in other regions.

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Milas Advanced Antisubmarine Missile System

92UM0963C Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (signed to press 2 Mar 92)
pp 70-71

[Article by Capt 3d Rank S. Leyko: "Milas Advanced Antisubmarine Missile System"]

[Text] Naval command authorities of leading capitalist countries today are devoting much attention to the development of antisubmarine weapons, particularly antisubmarine missile systems. In particular, the French company Matra and the Italian company OTO Melara, together with their countries' navies, are completing preparation of the Milas (Missile de Lutte-Anti Sousmarine) advanced antisubmarine missile system, designed to combat enemy submarines. As is reported in the foreign press, it is planned to place this system on Italian guided-missile frigates which presently do not have antisubmarine missile weapons and also to replace the obsolete Malafon antisubmarine missiles, developed in the early 1960's with a range of up to 15 km, carried on French frigates and destroyers.

The Milas antiship missile system includes antiship missiles of the same name housed in launch canisters, a missile-firing control system, a technical monitoring system, and missile launch preparation instruments. When preparing initial data for the firing, information from the ship's general systems is used: the ship sonar system [GAS], gyrocompass, vertical gyro, anemometer, and log. The fire control system also has an information link with the ship's automated combat control system.

The Milas antisubmarine missile was developed based on the existing French-Italian Otomat Mk2 antiship missile, which uses a small antisubmarine torpedo as the warhead.

According to foreign source data, the missile has a launch weight of about 800 kg, a range of fire of 5 km (minimum) to 60 km (maximum), and a flight speed of 300 meters per second. For these characteristics, it is considerably superior to the Malafon and Ikara antisubmarine missiles currently in service. The maximum flight trajectory altitude is 200 meters. Its launch preparation time is 20 seconds. The Milas antisubmarine missile is housed in a shipping-launch canister, which weighs 1 ton and is 6.1 meters long.

The Milas missile (Figure 1) is made according to a normal aerodynamic configuration and has a cylindrical airframe with a folding crossed swept wing and four swept aerodynamic control surfaces. The vertical pair of control surfaces is used to control the angle of yaw, and the horizontal pair is used to control the angle of roll and pitch. Structurally, the missile consists of the propulsion system, on-board control system, and warhead.

The propulsion system is a sustainer turbojet engine and two solid-propellant launching boosters, which separate from the missile after burning. To supply air to the turbojet engine, there are four air intakes located at the middle of the missile airframe on the same surfaces as the outer wing panels. The tail section with its sustainer engine and on-board control system equipment is connected to the antisubmarine torpedo by an adapter.

The on-board control system includes an inertial system, a radio altimeter, and a remote-control system. The inertial system and radio altimeter provide flight guidance and control in the launch and sustained flight phases to bring the antisubmarine missile to the probable location of the underwater target according to a program which is worked out and input into the on-board equipment of the ship's missile control system prior to launch. The missile is launched from a stationary launcher from the shipping-launcher canister using launching boosters. The cruising flight at a speed of $M=0.9$ is supported by the turbojet engine and takes place at an altitude of 200 meters. The inertial guidance system makes it possible to make corrective turns in the firing plan within the range of plus or minus 200 degrees, which virtually does not restrict maneuver of the ship platform at the time of launch. The remote-control system makes it possible to make corrections to the flight trajectory in accordance with new data on the target location both from the launching ship and from a remote control post (helicopter or another ship).

The antisubmarine missile's engine operates for a specific period of time corresponding to the desired firing range. It stops at a calculated point, and the engine separates. The aerodynamic fairing of the warhead (torpedo) is jettisoned, and a drag chute opens, ensuring a safe landing of the torpedo in the water. The chute reduces the torpedo's falling speed to 50 meters per

Figure 1. Milas Antisubmarine Guided Missile:




Рис. 1. Противолодочная управляемая ракета «Милас»: А — кормовой отсек с двигательной установкой; В — топливный бак; С — бортовое электронное оборудование; D — переходник; E — противолодочная торпеда; 1 — аэродинамический обтекатель; 2 — стартовые ускорители; 3 — консоли крыла; 4 — аэродинамические рули

Key:

- A. Tail section with propulsion system
- B. Fuel tank
- C. On-board electronic equipment
- D. Adapter

- E. ASW torpedo
- 1. Aerodynamic fairing
- 2. Launching boosters
- 3. Outer wing panels
- 4. Aerodynamic control surfaces

second. After entering the water, the propulsion system starts up. The torpedo submerges to the desired depth and begins searching for the target according to the program. Upon detecting the target, the torpedo's movement is controlled by the homing system. The profile of the missile's flight path is shown in Figure 2.


It is planned to use advanced 324-mm Murena antisubmarine torpedoes (weight about 290 kg, range 10,000 meters, speed 50 knots) as the warhead for the Milas antisubmarine missile for the French Navy or the A-290 (weight 270 kg, speed 50 knots) for the Italian Navy.

Delivery of the antisubmarine missile for navies of NATO countries is also possible. In this case, the small Mk46 (USA) or Stingray (Great Britain) torpedoes may be used as the warhead.

Series production of the Milas antisubmarine missile is scheduled to begin in 1993-1995. It is planned to produce a total of 150 missiles for the French Navy and 144 for the Italian Navy.

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Figure 2. Flight Path of a Milas Antisubmarine Missile:



Key:

- 1. Launch flight phase
- 2. Sustained flight phase
- 3. Separation of rocket from antisubmarine missile
- 4. Search and guidance of torpedo to target

In Search of the Underwater Enemy

92UM0963A *MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian*
No 2, Feb 92 (signed to press 2 Mar 92) pp 62-65

[Article by Lt Col S. Nesterov: "In Search of the Underwater Enemy (The Effect of Static Electricity on the Operation of Airborne Magnetic Anomaly Detection Gear)"]

[Text] Experience of submarine search flights using airborne magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) gear indicates that virtually all operators encounter the phenomenon of irregular background noise and, as a result, a fairly large number of returns on tape similar to returns from unknown objects. This makes it considerably more difficult to classify them and, in the end, decreases the effectiveness of the search. In these conditions, the problem of signal discrimination becomes relevant.

What may be the origin of such interference?

Besides the bottom contour, geomagnetic phenomena, the effect of magnetic anomalies and storms, a source of interference is also static electricity, which sometimes completely precludes the possibility of searching using MAD gear. This leads to the need for a brief examination of the physical properties of this phenomenon and working up of practical recommendations for ASW aircraft crews.

The electric field in the atmosphere is characterized quantitatively by voltage. Above the underlying surface, in the absence of unfavorable atmospheric phenomena (rain, fog, snowstorm, winds over 6 meters per second, total cloud cover greater than 3-4 balls), it is taken as uniform. But since a crew relatively rarely encounters a uniform electric field in flight, tapes with even background noise are also rarely encountered, that is, the voltage of the electric field changes in space and time, and especially sharply during a change in weather.

The lower atmosphere possesses considerable conductivity due to the existence of ions, which form through ionization of cosmic rays and also decay of radioactive substances of the air and the earth's crust. In addition, there are always aerosol particles in the atmosphere, which can be divided into the following according to their origin: polar, background, sea, remote continental, desert dust, industrial areas, urban, and stratospheric.

As we can see, the sources of atmospheric aerosols are extremely diverse. One of them is the world oceans, about 0.3 percent of the surface of which is covered by foam bubbles. They burst, and 5×10^8 tons of aerosol particles are discharged into the atmosphere each year. Soil erosion provides roughly the same amount of aerosol particles. In addition, up to 1×10^7 tons of organic matter is formed in the atmosphere during gas-chemical processes. The bulk of the aerosol particles are located in a layer 2-3 km from the earth's surface, and the distribution of electrical charges takes place in proportion to this.

Processes of the formation and disappearance of ions (recombination) from one group of mobility to another are constantly taking place in the atmosphere as a result of the depositing of light ions on heavier particles.

It is known that the atmosphere's electric conductivity depends on the presence and amount of ions in the air, but their concentration changes in space and time. Everyone has seen what a complicated configuration lightning has. This occurs because electric current chooses the path with the least resistance (i.e., with the greatest concentration of ions). Several types of currents of the atmosphere are distinguished:

- conduction currents** are caused by the movement of atmospheric ions under the effect of the electric field;
- convective currents** are associated with the movement of charges in the atmosphere together with turbulent and convective flows;
- displacement currents** are associated with the presence of an electric field voltage derivative other than zero with respect to time, that is, with voltage variations;
- precipitation currents** are associated with transfer of charges by falling precipitation;
- lightning currents** are associated with transfer of charges during lightning storm discharges;
- point currents** occur at high voltages of the electric field usually during and before thunderstorm periods and are seen on bushes, trees, and buildings.

Only the first three types of currents are seen during good weather. But the amount of voltage changes in space and time both during uniform weather and during changes in the weather.

The presence of areas with a different polarity of charged ions is observed in clouds of all types. The number of these areas may vary, and the areas themselves are in constant movement.

The electric charge acquired by an aircraft in flight and its amount depend on the currents charging and discharging the aircraft, that is, on the properties of the environment in which it is flying (the amount of voltage of the electric field, the size and amount of charged particles, the presence of clouds and precipitation, their phase state, the charge polarity of particles), and on the characteristics of the aircraft (its size, shape, the material from which it is made, the covering, the type and power of the engines, the parameters of static deflectors) and the flight conditions (altitude, speed).

The charge currents are associated mainly with the interaction of ions with the skin of the aircraft and also with the interaction of particles of unburned fuel and combustion products with the material of the aircraft exhaust system. Due to the complex shape of the aircraft, the distribution of charges on its surface is not uniform. The density of the charge is maximum at the ends of the wings, tailplane, vertical stabilizer, and nose section of the fuselage.

One can see from Figure 1 that placement of the sensing measuring element of the MAD gear in the upper portion of the vertical stabilizer has been poorly chosen (in the area of maximum amount of charges).

Figure 1. Distribution of Self-Charge over the Surface of the Aircraft




Рис. 1. Распределение собственного заряда по поверхности самолета

One can see from the graph given in Figure 2 that in its path the aircraft encounters atmospheric electric field voltages that vary both in sign and amount; consequently, the aircraft charge will change constantly and the change in charge will be accompanied by currents charging or discharging the aircraft.

Figure 2. Graph of the Change in Voltage of the Electric Field of the Atmosphere in Space





Рис. 2. График изменения напряженности электрического поля атмосферы в пространстве

Figure 3. Main Points of Charging and Discharging of an Aircraft by Static Electricity in Flight: I_z —current of charge by particles of the atmosphere; I_{av} —current of charge generated by the engines; I_p —current of point discharge; I_{koll} —current of discharge by separating particles.



The charge and discharge current (see Figure 3) are caused by the following factors:

- conductivity of the atmosphere;
- conductivity of the stream of hot gases;
- separation of particles and ions from the electrically charged aircraft;
- the current of the corona discharge through dischargers and protruding parts of the aircraft (struts, antennas, wing edges).

All currents, both charging and discharging, depend on:

- the aircraft's flight speed (proportional to speed squared);
- the aircraft's flight altitude (inversely proportional to the flight altitude) according to the exponential law;
- the variability and amount of voltage of the electric field in the atmosphere;
- the dielectric of which the MAD gear fairing is made, the metal of the aircraft structure, and its covering.

Upon charging of nonconducting sections, the charge from dielectrics cannot discharge quickly into the atmosphere, and even small charge currents in these conditions lead to accumulation of a large charge. There arises a difference of potentials between the dielectric and the fuselage metal until a breakdown occurs, and then everything is repeated. Small lightning on the cockpit window panels, which many pilots have observed in flights, can serve as an example of this. The same discharges occurring from the surface of the dielectric fairing of the MAD gear to the metal of the aircraft structure, in the immediate proximity to the measuring element, lead to returns and a powerful increase in the level of dynamic background noise on the MAD gear tape. Since the amount of voltage at a specific altitude is rarely constant (see Figure 2), an aircraft first charges and then discharges in flight. The charge and discharge currents change constantly (it is absolutely not mandatory that they are corona currents). As a result of this, the magnetic field created by these currents in the coils of the sensing measuring

element change, and in the end the stylus of the magnetometer begins to make oscillations depending on the quantity of the currents and their proximity to the sensing element. In corona discharges, as a result of a momentary jump in current, the stylus is forced to deviate sharply, and a return results. An increase in dynamic background noise under flight conditions changes the valid signal to background noise ratio, which in turn makes it difficult for the operator to isolate the valid signal. In unfavorable conditions (sharp changes in the voltage of the electric field of the atmosphere), the background noise may completely mask the signal from the sought object.

It is easy to verify that a large number of returns on the MAD gear tape are caused by static electricity by flying over one route several times or launching a pair of aircraft in trail formation at minimum intervals over one route. It is better to do this in an area precluding the appearance of random objects (desert, inland sea). In the first instance, the returns received and areas of increased background noise will not coincide in location and numbers for the various tacks, that is, they are caused not by the effect of "geology" or the object, but by static electricity.

In the second instance, the return and areas of increased background noise received on different aircraft will not coincide in place (if they were caused by "geology" or the object, they would coincide in place). Thus, the appearance of returns in a previously "quiet" area is caused by static charge of the aircraft in the atmosphere.

This description of the essence of the phenomenon does not claim to be complete. It is obvious that this question needs serious research and will be studied more. However, it makes it possible to warn crews about the existence of this phenomenon, work out recommendations for flying personnel, and call the attention of designers of magnetometers and aircraft to the presence and effect of static electricity on MAD gear so they can take this into account in future developments.

What recommendations can be made to flying personnel?

1. Any return (series of returns) similar to a return from the object sought should be classified using sonobuoys.
2. If several returns are received on one or several tacks during the search, the flight area in this case is electrostatically nonuniform and unsuitable for search with the magnetometer at the given time, although at another time it may be, and the search should be conducted using sonobuoys.
3. Returns received from turning some equipment on or off (fuselage lighting, ventilation fans in the aft compartment, and so forth) are easily identified by reports of the crew members using this equipment and are not stipulated in this article.

4. Returns from local magnetic anomalies and sunken ships show up constantly in one place and cannot be confirmed using sonobuoys.

5. In order to check the influence of static electricity on a certain type of MAD gear, it is necessary to make a flight with two or three aircraft in trail formation at minimum intervals over one route and compare the places of the returns received. If the returns do not coincide in place, this will confirm the influence of static electricity on operation of the MAD gear.

6. For small aircraft with slow search speeds and also for obsolete types of MAD gear, the influence of static electricity will be less than for aircraft with high search speeds.

Up to now, questions of static electricity have been studied basically just to ensure flight safety, that is, they have worked with large electric potentials and tried to reduce the electric charge as much as possible, which has been achieved by using dischargers. Studying the influence of static electricity charge currents on a sensing instrument such as MAD gear has been ignored both by the developers of MAD gear and by the chief aircraft designers.

It should be expected that with the creation of new, more sensitive magnetometers, developers and then operators will come across this phenomenon in real earnest. The presence of this phenomenon must be recognized, and methods must be developed to compensate for it. Until the influence of static electricity on MAD gear is eliminated, increasing the effectiveness of search using magnetometers is out of the question. It rests with science.

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Career of Admiral Kasatonov Outlined

92UM0995A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 May 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Capt 1st Rank S. Bystrov, editor of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Naval Section, under the rubric "The Army and Navy Through the People": "A Turbulent Segment of Time"]

[Text] History singled out a turbulent segment of time for Adm Igor Kasatonov, who assumed command of the Black Sea Fleet 30 years after his father.

Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov did not anticipate and could not guess that it would be the Black Sea Fleet in which he began his naval career, which would almost separate him from the hard but familiar job of a sailor and toss him into the murky, bitter sea of political conflicts.

How quickly it happened! How devastating it was! Less than a year ago we were having tea with Rear Adm Kasatonov at a dacha outside Moscow. He was first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet at that time. He spoke of something unlikely, the possibility of commanding the Black Sea Fleet. The situation of the Black Sea Fleet itself was safe and serene, however, and nothing clouded its existence.

And now the Black Sea Fleet is a bone of contention between the two largest fragments of the splintered nation. The admiral, whose name was already on the list of our naval leaders thanks to his father, was not the lucky, as it turned out, recipient of the command of a "powerful, modern, oceangoing" fleet. He became a hostage to a disaster unprecedented in the fleet's history.

Yes, the Black Sea Fleet's entire history has been uneasy. More than once it has been on the brink of ruin. It has from days of old lost not only its sailors, but its admirals as well. It has scuttled its own ships, suffered the occupation of its bases, experienced a split into reds and whites, but it has never known a split into Ukrainians and Russians. The break occurred there where things were solid. Yes, it is time to admit that nothing lasts forever. There is no unity. Yet the split tearing apart the Black Sea Fleet seems as stunningly improbable to our contemporaries as a splitting of the Eurasian continent, let us say.

Whenever a split occurs, time is divided into "pre-" and "post-split." Nothing could divide Adm I. Kasatonov's life more sharply than this. Previously the service was a joy; now it is sorrow. Even scheduled cruises and exercises have ceased to be thoroughly professional concerns. This is against a background of the political assertion that the fleet is capable of action, its unity intact.

But when naval charts are spread out in front of Kasatonov, when he puts his thoughts to purely creative naval matters, the admiral automatically forgets about what is transpiring in the troubled land behind him. He is at sea body and soul. A small sea, a resort area, uniquely leaked into a continent, which has given birth to great Russian sailors. Igor Kasatonov began his naval career in 1956 on this same Black Sea. The son of the already well-known Admiral Vladimir Afanasyevich Kasatonov had no trouble gaining admission to the Black Sea Higher Naval School imeni P.S. Nakhimov. Not because his father commanded the fleet at that time, but because he had graduated from school with a silver medal. Two entrance exams with excellent marks, and the school doors opened for secondary-school graduate Kasatonov, graduating him 4 years later as a lieutenant in the missile field, the most promising specialty at that time.

He did not have it easier than the others there, nor during his entire subsequent service. On the contrary, for a couple of years his classmates looked askance at the admiral's son. Only his perseverance in his studies, his extraordinary capacity for work and his purposefulness, which subsequently became even stronger, made his

comrades respect him and bound them together with friendship for many decades. And the fact that he would move ahead of all the graduates of the 1st company was taken for granted. Only once did he relinquish first place—to classmate V. Kalabin. They were both rear admirals. Kasatonov had commanded the Kola Flotilla for 5 years; Kalabin, the Mediterranean Squadron for slightly more than a year. Igor Vladimirovich was recommended for the position of chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet. Prior to the appointment he went on leave. Just at that time, in August 1986, an accident occurred in the fleet involving loss of life. Kalabin became chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet.

After graduating from the school with a red diploma, Igor Kasatonov had a choice. He did not feel that he could remain in the Black Sea Fleet, commanded at that time by his father, and he chose the Pacific Fleet. He was born there, in the Far East, in 1939.

To give him experience as a missileman, he was still first assigned to the Black Sea "firing" missile ship Gnevnyy. The commander's son strove to earn his own prestige as rapidly as possible. This constant striving to "separate himself" from his father in the service made him very demanding of himself. Igor Vladimirovich also regarded this as his duty to his father.

I have visited Igor Vladimirovich's sister in her Moscow apartment. On a hanger in the entrance hall hangs Vladimir Afanasyevich's overcoat, as though he has just entered and taken it off. Outsiders rarely visit the apartment. And the overcoat is for her, as though her father is always with them. Even now, when Igor Vladimirovich works in the office which was for 3 decades the office of Admiral Vladimir Afanasyevich Kasatonov, he no doubt sometimes senses the presence of his father.

In 1989 I. Kasatonov, first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet, headed a visit to the USA by Soviet ships. We got to know one another well there for the first time. Igor Vladimirovich had just been buried and his mother was seriously ill. A very unfortunate time for a long cruise. In this family, however, everything has taken a back seat to the sailor's duty. I wrote down a few sentences spoken by Igor Vladimirovich about his parents:

"Father was kind to the children, although he was rarely home. He still managed to work with my sister, but I received most of his attention. He trusted me, because I never deceived him. Mother was strict. My sister and I were excellent students. Mama worked with us and paid particular attention to our reading. We became accustomed to working in the home. My sister and I did the housecleaning. We were certainly not acquisitive, even though we were well-off. Father always demanded modesty and simplicity."

The men on Lt Kasatonov's very first ship began to respect him right away. He was immediately authorized

to command an independent subunit and was immediately cleared to serve as officer of the deck and to stand watch underway. This test of the future fleet officer was practically error-free. The way a young officer starts out is how he will continue. Igor Kasatonov served only six months on the Gnevnyy, but he left the ship experienced beyond his years. The young commander of a battery of cruise missiles had performed six launchings, all of them successful. Very few people had this kind of success in the developing missile fleet. He was even entrusted to conduct an exercise with a group of generals visiting the fleet from the General Staff military Academy.

On 15 June 1961 the destroyer Upornyy, to which I. Kasatonov had been transferred, departed on a cruise around Europe and then to the Pacific Fleet by the northern maritime route. Thus began the future admiral's first long cruise. And not a year went by for him without cruises and combat service, with the exception of several years spent in command classes at the Naval Academy and the General Staff Military Academy. That is not counting the correspondence classes with the automation and remote-control department at the Sevastopol Tool-Building Institute. The Capt-Lt took them to increase his special knowledge.

Igor Kasatonov entered combat service as commander of the large ASW ship Provornyy after serving nine years as an officer.

After graduating from the Naval Academy he assumed command of the large BPK [large ASW ship] Ochakov, which was still in the final stages of construction. Commanders do not like to visit a ship under construction. This is a difficult time with a lot of administrative concerns. However, he who hopes that the post of ship's commander will not be his last must have a ship under construction as part of his experience. Following his assignment to the Ochakov I. Kasatonov received early advancement to the rank of captain 2nd rank (yet not until he had graduated from the academy). The first and only rank he received early. He spent an entire 6 years as a rear admiral, in a flotilla, before he wore the shoulder boards of a full admiral. This is perhaps the rarest case in the navy.

There is no such thing as service without clouds along the way, however, and no easy way at sea. Elemental occurrences, happenstance, success and failure, and the sailor has only his character and acquired skill to counter it all.

In 1974 Kasatonov, now an experienced commander, was trusted to go into combat service without a superior on board. At that time this was rare. They approached the Bosphorus. It was the end of December, and the weather was abominable. And here it was especially bad. There was a dense fog. According to his instructions he was to wait. He could not wait long though. The daylight hours are short in December, and the Bosphorus had to be crossed during the day. They entered the dense fog. Prior to this the commander had requested an update on the situation on vessels anchored at the entrance. They

had passed through the two bends in the strait, when he learned that the navigation crew had lost its bearings. The situation was critical. The Bosphorus had ruined the careers of many. It was enough to lose one's bearings for a few minutes, even seconds. (I myself was a participant in the incident in 1978 in which the cruiser Dzerzhinskiy with Adm N. Khovrin, fleet commander, aboard almost crashed into the Bosphorus shore. There had been a slight miscalculation of the time of a turn). Kasatonov issued the command "Both engines, half-speed astern," and the Ochakov moved backward to the exit from the strait.

They repeated the entire approach operation, and once again ran into the fog. From all sides one could hear the sound of motor vehicles and the barking of dogs. The whole time it seemed that the coastline was too close. They reached the famous bridge, and it was as though the fog had been cut in half. Ahead lay fine, sunny weather. What a relief! From there they sailed at 30 knots until they reached the Sea of Marmara in order to get back on schedule. Six months later the Ochakov returned to Sevastopol, having won all three challenge banners which existed in the Mediterranean Squadron at that time.

The higher the post of a fleet admiral, the broader the range of his duties, which are sometimes, unfortunately, far removed from the designation of a sailor. Our country managed to become a strong naval power but was unable to permit the sailors to devote themselves entirely to the service. Sometimes the performance of even fleet commanders was evaluated to a far greater degree on the basis of some administrative actions rather than the most important thing: maintaining a high level of combat readiness.

The higher up the ladder Igor Vladimirovich rose, the more he was forced to immerse himself in purely administrative, construction and social matters. He always evaluated himself primarily from the professional standpoint, however.

During his time as flotilla commander he had to deal with the buildup of the formation's material base, the construction of a repair base, moorings and depots, improving the garrisons.... The primary thing which received his attention, however, was the uniting of the flotilla.

During his time as first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet Igor Vladimirovich especially valued those periods when he could deal with purely naval tasks.

One such occasion was the transfer of the nuclear-powered cruiser Kalinin from the Baltic to the Northern Fleet. Following are excerpts from Igor Vladimirovich's comments on this:

"I arrived at Baltiysk on 21 December. The cruiser was anchored in the roadstead. The wind at sea was 5-6 on the Beaufort scale. I was unable to reach the ship until

morning. We were to be escorted by the patrol ship Bditelnyy. There was a large number of workers on the Kalinin.

"Despite the bad weather, we set out for the Baltic straits. I ordered the field staff to examine the situation on the ship, to train the people and work with them. And to see that no one would think up ways to test us. The main thing was to reach our destination.

"I looked over the ship. Sealing the hull involved a lot of problems. Without it the ship would not be safe. There were three instances in which the cruiser's course was intercepted. We had to work up 'full speed astern.' And this on such a hulk. Capt 2nd Rank Chebotarev, commander, felt confident, however. Prior to that he had commanded the cruiser Murmansk.

"The Main Staff ordered us to drop anchor in the area of Cape Skagen due to the weather. The Danish coast was nearby. A long night, a short day and a very expensive ship. Danish coastal defense boats were getting close to us. I posted an escort vessel as security, as an ASW patrol, and it worked hard to guard us.

"In the Barents Sea we encountered a gale, the polar night and numerous fishermen. I had to close off Kola Bay to everyone, activate the entire coastal observation system, summon tugboats to accompany us, establish direct contact with the fleet's command post and request navigational bearings. I also had to subordinate the fleet's entire support system in the area to assuring safe passage for the cruiser."

And so the entire trip was executed in a state of nervous tension, because there is no greater danger for a fleet commander than the loss of a ship. And his entire service is one of nervous tension, because one has more and more ships under his command, within his responsibility. It is difficult to lose a ship in combat, so much worse in time of peace. Fortunate is the admiral who has never experienced this. And only he who knows how to preserve the fleet can command a fleet.

History assigned Adm I. Kasatonov a turbulent period of time. National and political adversities.... These are the elemental forces before which man would appear to be helpless. The men of the fleet deal with the elements all the time, but somehow manage to feel confident in their struggle with them. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet today has plenty of courage and skill. And if the Black Sea Fleet manages to hold on and continues to be a unified force, no one will be able to belittle Adm I. Kasatonov's merits in the matter.

Details of 1968 Submarine Reactor Explosion

92UM0987A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 May 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Sikorskiy: "18 Years Before Chernobyl: A Similar Accident Occurred on a

Northern Fleet Experimental Submarine and the Fates of its Victims Are Still Hidden Behind a Curtain of Secrecy"]

[Text] The accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] and ChP's [extraordinary events] with less significant consequences at other nuclear power plants throughout the "nuclear" world increasingly in recent years remind mankind about the fact that the sort of domesticated atom is extremely "sensitive" and does not fail to show its indomitable disposition when the opportunity presents itself. But at the dawn of nuclear engineering, the euphoria of the dilettantes did not permit the thought that people could lose control of the atom that had been placed at their service. Even in the emerging nuclear-powered submarine fleet, it was considered to be especially chic to invite a high guest who was visiting the nuclear-powered submarine into the reactor compartment, to sit on the reactor, and in response to the guest's astonished glance, to offer the guest a seat on the neighboring reactor.

It is possible that it is this frivolousness toward handling the atom that explains how the navy reacted to one of the first submarine reactors accidents which they were subsequently ordered to forget about for a long time. It was only after the adoption of normative acts in Russia on the social protection of victims as a result of the accident at the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant] and of special risk subunit veterans that the heroes and victims of this story could describe what had happened to them in already long ago 1968...

On June 15, 1961, Captain 3rd Rank Pavel Leonov received his assignment to the newest at that time and unique until now Northern Fleet nuclear submarine.

This experimental submarine with a displacement of 4,000 tons was equipped with fundamentally new reactors with a metal heat carrier designed by Academician A. Leypunskiy. While still at the stage of engineering calculations, they overlooked the technical difficulties of implementing the designer's idea, and doubts were expressed in the reactors' reliability. Difficulties in setting the reactors up substantially increased during the period of the boat's construction—it was delayed for four years. But the first warning signal sounded when the new reactors' specific malfunctions were discovered during a cruise in the Mediterranean Sea in 1965. After returning from the cruise, they conducted the modernization and reloading of the fuel core on the boat. This in principle routine operation resulted in an additional reduction of the reactor's reliability which later had dramatic consequences.

On May 19, 1968, after completing preventive maintenance, Captain 1st Rank L. Leonov took his submarine out to sea where he was to conduct routine testing for five days. On May 24, the submariners only had to conduct the last work: to bring the reactors up to full power and to sail at maximum speed. During the tests to do this, the accident protection was activated each time

in the left reactor until finally the same thing happened in it that had occurred in Chernobyl AES reactor number four in 1986. Only the radioactive materials from the reactor at the Chernobyl AES went out into the environment, but the powerful pumps on the submarine drove the 90 percent enriched uranium into the first loop which had only thermal isolation protection. There were 142 men on the submarine that day—submariners of the first and second crews, plant experts and NII [Scientific Research Institute] representatives...

At approximately 11:27, the din of ringing alarms sounded like howling monkeys—at that moment, the ships' radiation monitoring instruments began to steadily move up the scale. Captain 1st Rank P. Leonov began to receive reports—the one more alarming than the previous one, and the commander decided to surface immediately. They urgently conducted ventilation of the compartments where quite a large quantity of radioactive gases and aerosols had accumulated. No one on board the submarine yet knew that the active reaction zone "had left" the reactor and "was wandering" through the first loop. Neither the radiation supervisor nor the technicians could say anything specific, but only the ship's doctor delivered the not very comforting news: "Comrade commander, judging by everything, five of the special reactor room personnel have received a strong dose. All of the symptoms are present: chills, nausea..."

The left reactor was halted almost immediately. Under the power of just the right reactor, the submarine set a course for base which took nearly five hours. This was quite enough time for the officers of the electrical-mechanical department, who suggested that the entire matter was a malfunction in the steam generator, and they were seriously exposed to radiation while attempting to repair it.

The question of evacuating the crew arose only at the pier, when the task force radiation safety experts headed by Major V. Vladimirov ascertained that the radiation level totaled 15 Roentgens per hour outside the reactor's pressure vessel. But the need to maintain the reactors in operation even at the base in order to leave the alloy that circulated in the first loop warm was a design peculiarity of the nuclear-powered submarine's power plant. Therefore, the decision on the immediate evacuation of personnel was made only after the report to Naval Main Headquarters and to the CPSU Central Committee Military Department. Only the commander and the watch at the reactor on the right side remained on board. The quartermaster also flatly refused to be evacuated: "There are tens of thousands of rubles worth of food and equipment on board! They will steal it, and then will I have to go to court later?" Indeed, there is one step from the tragic to the ludicrous: this officer's fear of a possible shortage exceeded his fear of the lethal threat of radiation exposure...

Submariner-nuclear power plant experts who were gathered from the entire navy, approximately 50 people,

arrived at the base on the third day. But, I remind you, that submarine was one of a kind and they could know its power plant only in general terms. They found a rather unique solution to the situation: right there at the pier, they drew with chalk the fourth reactor compartment with all of its passageways, mechanisms, and valves. Here they also learned: "You open the bulkhead hatch, take three steps and turn to the right. There will be two valves directly in front of you which a little—turn three revolutions to the right. And immediately blow upward..."

Since the active reaction zone had circulated through the pipeline of the first loop, they decided, in particular, to encase the pipes in two millimeter plates of emergency lead-plate—they gathered them from throughout the navy. But they turned out to be few. They had to gather all of the shot from nearby hunting clubs—again it wasn't enough! Aircraft airlifted another nearly 20 tonnes of shot directly from Moscow. They rapidly "packaged" lead-plate in tarpaulin sacks weighing 10 kilograms each at the shore base's shop. Later, seamen from neighboring submarines and shore-based subunits carried the sacks to the submarine and placed them on the pipeline at strictly determined locations. Each person only made one trip.

Captain 1st Rank P. Leonov was at the pier, in the submarine, supervised the unloading of weapons and ammunition, regeneration, and food, practically without sleep, for eight days—from the moment of the accident until his hospitalization.

After completion of the initial accident clean-up, the submarine was found to be unfit for operation. It sat in "quarantine" for many years until the methodology was developed to scrap it. The boat has ceased to exist.

The fates of the accident clean-up participants developed in different ways. Pavel Fedorovich was hospitalized twice in 1968 and was treated at a sanatorium. He was transferred to the Baltic a year later. He has lost track of many of those with whom he served on the submarine. He knows that nine men died at what we are accustomed to calling the prime of life at various times. He has fragmentary information about some of them. For example, Special Reactor Compartment Chief Warrant Officer S. Lotunov (he received 1,600 instead of 600 lethal Roentgens) had a leg and the fingers of his hands amputated. He was still alive in 1970.

It is practically impossible to find special risk subunit veterans—there is no mention about the radiation they were exposed to even in their personal files. That is how it also was with P. Leonov. Northern Fleet Archives, in response to a query, referred Leonov to the Central Naval Archives. From there they responded: "We do not have the information you requested. We recommend you query the hospital in the city of Severomorsk." The copy of the history of the disease that was received from the Navy's 4th Central Military Medical Commission clearly did not explain anything, and it called the most

severe radiation exposure something uncomprehensible and in a circumscribed manner: occupational exposure. Finally, after 1.5 years of correspondence, he managed to receive an excerpt from the real history of the disease which obviously had been preserved in total secrecy: "...P.F. Leonov was exposed to 50 Roentgens and suffered a radiation reaction." This dose actually totaled no less than 225 Roentgens, according to the data of the 1968 state commission experts.

Like many other citizens of the former Union who have been deprived of their rights to material compensation for lost health through super-secrecy, the special risk subunit veterans, to which the submariners—the first members of the nuclear-powered navy—belong, are united in the hope of surviving in this world that has been cruel to them. The Committee of Special Risk Subunit Veterans that was formed recently in St. Petersburg plans to take under its protection nuclear seamen like Leonov and others who were placed in the path of the atom that got out of control. Forgotten by the state that already no longer exists, these people are relying on the new structures. There is hardly a more noble cause than to render assistance to veterans whose lives became pure special risk.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Functions, Future of Space Engineering Institute

92UM0986A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 92 First edition p 4

[Interview with Military Space Engineering Institute imeni A.F. Mozhayskiy Head, Professor and Lieutenant-General Nikolay Maksimovich Chichevatov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent A. Vorobyev, St. Petersburg—Moscow, under the rubric: "Special for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA": "'Mozhayka': Secrets and Epaulets"]

[Text] The press did not report about what the Military Space Engineering Institute imeni A.F. Mozhayskiy is involved with until recently. Only in December 1990 did KRASNAYA ZVEZDA then a number of other publications lift the curtain of secrecy over the military VUZ [higher educational institution]. We have learned that scientific research in the sphere of missile-space technology is conducted and military engineering cadres are trained for space units here.

But even to this day, our readers know only the "formal" aspect of the VUZ. Meanwhile, it turns out that this educational institution has quite a few problems which Institute Head, Professor and Lieutenant-General N.Chichevatov discussed with me. I visited his office after I had toured 'Mozhyaka's' lecture halls and laboratories.

[Vorobyev] Nikolay Maksimovich, your educational institution is a very serious one. They even say that research is being conducted here to develop space weapons?

[Chichevatov] A lot is being said about us... By way of illustration, a device to destroy space junk has been developed in the institute's laboratories in the interests of ecology. So, I recently heard in this regard: they say, Mozhayka researchers have developed Engineer Gagarin's hyperboloid. Of course, to master a charge of plasma energy and to pass it into a directed filament—only a creative collective with great scientific potential is capable of doing this... But this is not at all a question of some sort of space weapon.

At the same time, the circle of our research is broad. The institute, through the strength of its professorial-teaching staff (we have 58 doctors and 595 candidates of sciences), is conducting large-scale scientific research work in the sphere of modern theoretical and applied space knowledge. This research is being conducted on the problems of collecting and processing information, developing space vehicles, and controlling orbital and ground-based space systems. We are developing promising systems for exploration and transportation-technical support and we are studying the problems of building special facilities and operating space systems...

[Vorobyev] So now would it be correct to call your institute a university?

[Chichevatov] Yes, if you bear in mind that, furthermore, personnel are being trained for space units at the institute. Incidentally, we recently proposed to the General Staff that the institute be transformed into a military university. There are grounds to do this. From 1986 to 1990, the institute conducted 160 scientific research projects, of them 53—were government and 21—were assigned by Ministry of Defense orders.

Close ties with the basic directions of development of modern science are characteristic of the institute's scientific work. There are over 30 scientific schools in the VUZ. Our scientists' research enjoys prestige in our country and abroad. We annually publish 8-10 all-union monographs, 50-60 articles in foreign publications, and 5-8 basic textbooks. We have close creative ties with more than 50 scientific organizations and VUZ's. Among them are Energiya, Salyut, Tayfun, and Vympel NPO's [Scientific Production Associations], space instrument making enterprises, and a number of other leading organizations of the space and defense industries.

[Vorobyev] In that case, I do not understand why people of science are suddenly leaving it and transferring to... cooperatives. Today, I myself met two of your scientists in shoulder boards with transfer papers at the KPP [entry control point]...

[Chichevatov] Of course, it's unfortunate that this is occurring. But there are reasons for this. And the material incentives for scientific research is not the last one. Here is an example: In 1990, Doctor of Technical Sciences Colonel S. Prisyazhnyuk earned over 850,000 rubles for the institute based on the results of economic contracts for scientific research work. But do you know how much he was paid for this work? A total of R500! (Only his salary). Little has changed since that time. They continue to economize on people of science. At the same time our scientists have earned tens of millions of rubles just through economic contracts in recent years and they have once again received—bonuses in the amount of one month's salary. That is the cause of the "brain drain". Add to this reason a ton of others. For example, the fact that every fourth family of institute servicemen—I have in mind the permanent staff—do not have apartments, without considering those who have been waiting many years for improved housing conditions. Officers have been compelled to live in the cadet dormitories.

Young people are also leaving us—cooperatives are enticing them with big money. And then there is also the reduction of the Armed Forces...

If I had my way, I would in general not begin to reduce scientists in the military VUZ system. Especially right now, under crisis conditions, when we need to at least preserve the scientific potential of the Armed Forces. In April 1991, I heard this figure in Moscow: 5,991 candidates of science and 677 doctors were working at the military academies. Right now, I suppose that their total number throughout Russia has been reduced to 4,000. So, on whom are we saving? A total of 4,000 military scientists! Excuse me, but can we really cut this potential at the root? I think that age criteria and their ability to work creatively must be at the basis of the current release of these specialists.

[Vorobyev] But we will hope that something will change in the future. Really, the Russian authorities are striving to help military science in some way...

[Chichevatov] In the future? I would like to think so. However, have you seen who is coming to the military VUZ? We recently conducted Open House Day. We invited graduates of schools from the entire country to come to see us.

So, the students who came turned out to be mainly from nearby Russian oblasts—Moscow, Kursk, Smolensk, and several others. Indeed, there were also some from other republics. But here is a list of those who came: from Moldova—2, Lithuania—2, Latvia—1, Byelarus—6 and, Ukraine—8. We had planned to select nearly 900 people this year.

Not only has the number of applicants for admission been reduced, qualitative changes have also taken place. And not for the better... And we must form special cadres who are trained in all respects. Incidentally, we have all

of the required conditions to do this: unique laboratory-experimentation complexes for applied space research, modeling of the situation and functioning of space systems, the control processes of space systems, training-simulator system complexes, nearly 500 different computers, and a computer center.

[Vorobyev] Incidentally, for those who desire to apply to your VUZ, it is important to know what specialties they will receive after their studies...

[Chichevatov] We conduct training of students and cadets in 27 specialties of mathematics, mechanics, electronics, engineering-technical, and geophysical profiles. Along with this, we are involved with the retraining of command engineering cadres from the troops (nearly 400 students per year) in 21 specialties.

[Vorobyev] At a number of civilian VUZ's, teachers are advocating the introduction of paid tuition. Is it possible that this is also needed at a military educational institution? Will those people desiring to attend not decrease?

[Chichevatov] I do not think there will be a decrease. A person who wants to study at a so prestigious VUZ will pay. For example, this variation is possible: the cadet signs a contract to perform military service and to be temporarily released from payment for his education. Furthermore, he would be paid an appropriate stipend. In the event the contract is abrogated, the cadet must reimburse the expenses for education for training and maintenance. VUZ graduates are finally released from possible payment of these expenditures after a definite term of officer service. This could promote the reduction of the acuteness of the "otkaznik" [a person who refuses to serve] problem.

And one more thing: as you know, in the developed capitalist countries, the amounts of centralized state financial payments to VUZ's depends on the category of the educational institution and its place in the overall ranking of national VUZ's. This is a question of accreditation of a higher school. This process is also gradually beginning in our country. As a result, it would be appropriate to pose the question of how, on the same level with civilian VUZ's, to conduct accreditation of military higher educational institutions. This will permit us to solve two very important tasks. First of all, only the very best VUZ's will be able to undergo accreditation at the state level. We could also thereby resolve the issue of educational institutions—candidates for possible reduction and disbandment. Secondly, the unique competition of higher educational institutions, including military VUZ's, that is conducted annually and the publication of their serial numbers in a sort of "table of ranks" could serve as a good point of reference for university applicants when selecting an educational institution, and also for higher state and military organs during the selection of candidates for the purposeful allocation of resources for the development of the educational process and scientific research.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russia Accused of Aggression by Azeris

92UM0973E Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 16 Apr 92 p 1

[Statement by the Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic to the Ministries of Defense of CIS Member-Countries and Other State and International Organizations]

[Text] In the name of national and human values, progress, and the people protected by it, the Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic considers it its duty to state the following and intends that the present troubles of the Azeri people, the war unleashed upon them, the genocide being accomplished under a carefully developed concept, the massacres, and plunder will not be ignored. The events of just the recent days and the regional and world political interests affected by these events and the Karabakh conflict, which has entered a new state with the formation of the CIS, force us to listen to the voice of truth.

The scale of economic, political, material, and military encroachments on Azerbaijan is expanding, as is the scale of terrorism and aggression.

Non-observance of the treaty signed during the formation of the CIS has put the Azeri people and the CIS at odds. The Russian Federation, declaring itself to be the legal successor to the USSR and using the economic, political, financial, and state structures and military might left to it by the collapsed empire, continues to pursue an imperial policy. Not doubting the fallacy of the creation and goals of the CIS, provoking inter-ethnic clashes and unofficially arming the opposing sides, Russia is pursuing an imperial policy and using military might as a tool for achieving its political goals and intentions. Deviating from the position of humanism and cooperation, the Russian Federation, having announced to the whole world its interest in settling the Karabakh conflict by peaceful, political means, is in fact participating in this undeclared war as an interested party with its newly created and inherited structures.

Pursuing a policy of terror and violence and military aggression against Azerbaijan, which has declared its independence, the Russian Federation is striving to drive the Azerbaijan Republic into the CIS at all costs. Even the world community's recognition of the independent, sovereign republic, its striving for peace, good-neighbor relations, and fruitful cooperation, and participation in the activities of international organizations cannot place a reliable barrier to the imperial policy. One of the goals of such a policy in the region is to cause the peoples to clash in the interests of the empire, set national liberation movements against one another, explode them from the inside, and, having imposed on the peoples the most unfavorable path of struggle, force them to accept its conditions.

The very process of creating the CIS shows that this new unification cannot be a reliable guarantee of national and human values, of intensifying the democratic processes, of ensuring the rights and freedoms of the peoples, and of mutually beneficial political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Proof of this is the tragic events in Malybeyli, Dzhamilli, the genocide in Khodzhal, and the economic, political, financial, and military sabotage against Azerbaijan.

Failure by the CIS and the Russian Federation to observe the protocol signed on 24 December 1991 shows that the 4th Army stationed in Azerbaijan and the existing structures have turned the Azeri people and Russian-speaking population whose fate is linked to the Azeris into their hostages. For four years now they have been sharing with the Azeris the deprivations and violence imposed on them and the troubles resulting from this.

The well-known agreement signed in 1991 expired on 24 February. But on 26 February, the 366th Regiment committed genocide in Khodzhal. Even old people, pregnant women, and babies were ruthlessly annihilated. The corpses and prisoners were treated brutally—they gouged out the eyes, scalped, and beheaded the prisoners, and raped the women and girls.

The Russian Federation has used CIS troops against the Azerbaijan Republic. Subunits of these troops were transferred to the disposal of the aggressor. Now soldiers of the Armenian Army are being trained in the CIS troops.

Soldiers and command personnel of the 366th Regiment, "having violated" the military oath and Shaposhnikov's order, departed, leaving in Khankendi the bulk of military equipment and ammunition belonging to the 366th Regiment.

Russia, announcing the inheritance of the USSR's international obligations and ignoring its obligations to the CIS, is granting its assistances every opportunity to use its territory in the undeclared war. Pro-Armenian circles in Russia are using the Azeri prisoners captured by the Armenian fighters to achieve their own political goals, and their future fate, like the truth about Karabakh, is being hidden from the world public. This proves that Russia is undertaking actions aimed against the Yalta Agreement and that it is taking not a neutral but an anti-Azerbaijan stand in the Karabakh conflict.

The Azerbaijan Republic is striving to reduce tension and normalize relations. However, CIS units located on the republic's territory, particularly in Baku, are pursuing other goals. Contrary to all laws and legal norms, they enter the city and open fire from combat equipment. This is contrary to the interests of the population of the Azerbaijan Republic. Armenian fighters, enjoying the support of the CIS troops and using military equipment in the border areas, are violating the republic's air and land borders. Taking all this into account and

considering the seriousness of the situation, the Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic demands:

1. To ensure the safety of citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic taken prisoner during the Karabakh war and presently held on the territory of the Russian Federation and CIS member-countries and that they not be used for political purposes.
2. To put an end to the use of forces, equipment, and personnel under the command and subordination of the Russian Federation against Azerbaijan and to stop training personnel and specialists for the warring Armenian side.
3. To put an end immediately to encroachments and aggression on the part of the Russian Federation, which has taken under its wing the side that unleashed the war and is torpedoing peace proposals.
4. To consider the Russian Federation not as a peace-maker in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict but as an ally of the Armenian Republic in the undeclared war being waged against Azerbaijan by the most brutal means.
5. To call to increase the responsibility of the Russian Federation as a member of the CIS and the Security Council, having the right of veto, and to regard its actions, inconsistent with international law, as aggressive and instigative.
6. To prosecute war criminals and condemn any encroachments on the peaceful policy of the Azerbaijan Republic.
7. To resolve once and for all the question of withdrawing military subunits, subordinate to the former USSR, then the CIS and now the Russian Federation, stationed on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic and also of dividing the property of the army.

Protection of the Azerbaijan Republic against an aggressor in accordance with international legal norms and laws must be recognized in fact. Peaceloving states and international organizations must use every means to protect Azerbaijan from aggression. Appealing to them, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan calls upon them to put out the fires of war.

The Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic notes that disrespect for international treaties, acts, charters, and regulations of international and regional associations and conferences, of which this state is a member, and pursuing an expansionist policy are contrary to the interests of both international associations and sovereign states. The application of political and economic methods and sanctions against states pursuing such a policy is, in essence, a demonstration of respect for their sovereign rights and the humanitarian essence of international associations. If such actions are aimed at protecting universal human values and protecting the rights of peoples, the states should not reject them.

The sovereign member-states of the CIS are also responsible to their peoples as subjects of international organizations. This responsibility demands that a party pursuing an expansionist policy and using military, political, and diplomatic pressure be condemned as an aggressor.

8 April 1992.

Russia-Azerbaijan Struggle for Control of 4th Army

92UM0973B Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian
No 17, 20-27 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Roman Glebov: "The Fate of the 4th Army: Unfinished and Legendary"]

[Text] Last week, in the first open confrontation of the republic armed forces with the former Soviet Army, the latter was victorious: soldiers of the 4th Army, taken under the jurisdiction of Russia, used weapons against soldiers of the Azerbaijan National Army [ANA] who had captured weapons depots in Gyandzha. In a search for political solutions, Pavel Grachev, Russia's deputy minister of defense, arrived in Baku on Monday. A possible result of the visit is the transfer of units of the 4th Army to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan, which may change the course of the Karabakh war.

According to military counterintelligence data of the 23d (Gyandzhinskaya) Division of the 4th Army, on Saturday, 18 April, when personnel were in the bath-house, ANA soldiers infiltrated the aviation munition depots. They demanded helicopter spare parts in exchange for the five guards and four MI-26 crew members taken hostage.

On Wednesday, Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, and Ragim Gaviyev, minister of defense of Azerbaijan, returned from Moscow for talks on returning the hostages, where they held consultations with the commander in chief of the CIS Armed Forces on the status of the 4th Army.

The talks went listlessly and livened up only by the appearance of armored equipment from the 23d Airborne Division, which encircled the depots. An assault force landed during this time blocked the roads. The Azerbaijan side also came alive and decided to take hostages: another six officers and two officer's daughters were taken prisoner in Gyandzha. The Azeri soldiers occupying the depot, in the words of the counterintelligence officers, "perceived the appearance of the armored equipment as the signal for assault and went out of control, and it is now difficult to establish who opened fire first."

As a result of the exchange of fire, according to military data, one Azeri soldier died (according to data of the Gyandzh People's Front, two Azeris were killed and three wounded). The depots were retaken, and the talks continued. All hostages were returned on Thursday at

22:00, and they testify that the Azeris, despite the death of their comrades, treated them well.

Experts explain the gracious treatment of the prisoners by the great hopes of the military leadership of Azerbaijan on Pavel Grachev, Russia's deputy minister of defense. He arrived in Baku on Monday on a secret mission. It is known only that he has been called upon to resolve the question not about the withdrawal, but about the status of the former Soviet Army on Azerbaijan's territory.

The prevailing opinion of those around Grachev is that individual units of the 4th Army should be transferred to Azerbaijan. If such a step were taken as the transfer of one-fourth of the Caspian Flotilla to Azerbaijan, it would confirm that "Russia is acting not as a peacemaker in the Karabakh war but, by arming both sides, is pursuing its imperial policy" (Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan statement of 16 April). This is the only claim by Azeri politicians with which Armenian politicians agree.

Border Troops Deployed in Azerbaijan Return to Ukraine

92UM1006B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
30 Apr 92 p 1

[Article by Sergey Astakhov: "Native Sons Returning Home: About 4,000 Ukraine-Origin Men Serving in Transcaucasus"]

[Text] In accordance with the President's 24 March 1992 Decree on Return to Ukraine for Further Duty of Servicemen Holding Ukraine Citizenship and Serving in Units Stationed on the Territory of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova, all the men affected will be transferred to the homeland.

The State Committee on Security of the Ukraine State Border has drawn up and transmitted to the Committee for State Border Security (Moscow) the draft of a bilateral agreement on the mechanics to be employed to transfer (recall) commissioned personnel, warrant officers (Army), warrant officers (Navy), extended-service conscripts, enlisted personnel, and noncommissioned officer personnel for continued service in the Republic in which they hold citizenship; included is a procedure for discharge into the reserve. Also provided in this document is a proposal for the training of commissioned cadre and junior specialists for border troops of the negotiating sides.

With due consideration of the situation existing in Azerbaijan and Armenia, men in compulsory service are to be transferred to Ukraine by 20 May 1992. Recall to the homeland of officers, warrant officers (Army), warrant officers (Navy), and extended-service personnel is slated for implementation in 1992 and 1993 on an individual basis, as determined by the State Committee on Security of the Ukraine State Border.

Ukraine's border troop authorities express their hope that the signing of this agreement can be effected in the near future.

Byelarus-CIS Bargain Over Division of Armed Forces

92UM1010A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 6 May 92 p 3

[Article by Igor Sinyakevich: "Byelarusian Army Taking Shape: Republic Now Most Militarized in Europe"]

[Text] Recently completed was the third and last round of talks between the delegations of military authorities of the CIS Unified Armed Forces headed by Colonel General Pyankov, and the Republic of Byelarus delegation headed by Mechislav Grib, the chairman of the Commission on Problems of National Security, Defense, and Struggle Against Crime. The purpose was to discuss the partitioning of units located on Republic of Byelarus soil and placement of the units under the Republic of Byelarus Armed Forces and the Strategic Forces, which are subordinated to the Unified Command. The result was a protocol containing a list of units that are to become part of the Unified Strategic Forces of the CIS; the protocol was signed by Byelarus Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and CIS Unified Armed Forces Commander Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. The agreement is to take effect upon approval by the Council of Heads of States of the CIS.

In accordance with the protocol, the Republic of Byelarus Armed Forces are to take over virtually all the military units of the Ground Forces and the PVO [Air Defense], with the exception of several training centers. The republic's Armed Forces will receive, according to rough estimates, 90 percent of the fighter-bomber force. Also to be subordinated to the republic is an air transport regiment. As far as strategic bombers are concerned, about 10 percent of this type of craft stationed on republic soil is to become Byelarusian property. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense, in a conversation with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA'S correspondent, said that "we took a bomber regiment, just to make sure." He also said that the Byelorussian Armed Forces will also be the recipient of military units where the most modern aircraft types are presently stationed.

In the opinion of parliamentary Subcommittee on Defense Chairman Leonid Privalov, the talks took place in a constructive manner, in that Byelarus did not attempt to "grab all it could." This position was appreciated by the CIS Unified Armed Forces delegation, but the latter did choose to argue about ownership of the Vitebsk Airborne Division, the air transport regiment, Pinsk Naval Training Center, Central Medical Depot, and certain other units. However, the Byelarusian side's point of view finally prevailed. The majority of the "negotiable units," including the Vitebsk Airborne Division, will go to the republic's Armed Forces. The property at the Central Medical Depot is to be divided up on

a percentage basis, while the fate of the Pinsk Naval Training Center will be the subject of a separate agreement. Byelarus does not intend to give up the entire technical base of this center, which served to train naval specialists of a lower level, since it can be utilized to prepare seamen for a merchant fleet, something which the republic is forming.

Thus, remaining on the soil of Byelarus is a group of strategic forces under the command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces with a total strength of about 40,000 men. It consists of two missile bases located in the cities of Lida and Mozyr, about half the aviation units, certain large training centers, and other units. As is commonly known, the status of the Strategic Forces has not yet been determined. It is Privalov's opinion that Byelarus is not about to demand immediate withdrawal of these forces from her soil. However, if there is to be a relocation, disposition of the property belonging to the majority of the strategic units (with the exception of missiles) should become the subject of negotiations.

The signing of the protocol for division of military units resulted in Byelarus' becoming—all of a sudden—the most militarized state in Europe. The republic's Armed Forces presently possess a strength of 130,000 men. With a population of 10 million, there are 10 divisions (compare with Ukraine: population of 50 million and 20 divisions). As far as Strategic Forces go, for every 43 citizens, there now is one serviceman. However, the Armed Forces are to undergo reductions. Plans call for the Byelarusian Army to eventually number 60,000 to 70,000 men. Nonetheless, in line with the military doctrine for the transition period, the Armed Forces for the present will be reduced by only 40 percent, with the manpower amounting to 90,000 men.

Something that has become a constant headache for the Republic's leadership is the social aspect of officers discharged from the Army. In addition, approximately 6,000 Byelarusian officers wish to return to the homeland to continue their service, while not more than 100 officers of other ethnic origins intend to leave Byelarus. The Republic's leadership is exercising the utmost care in their policies in an attempt to prevent a disregard for the interests of any particular persons.

In the area of financing of the Armed Forces, the expenditures required for maintenance alone of such a large army will amount to more than 15 billion rubles, even though it may not be necessary to make any arms purchases for the next two or three years. This amounts to half that required by the CIS Unified Armed Forces General Staff for the unified military budget. Expenditures as planned in the Republic's budget are to be on the order of 8 billion rubles.

UKRAINE

Committee on Servicemen's Issues Chairman on Work to Date

92UM0967A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
21 Apr 92 p 3

[Article by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric: "Structural Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces": "According to the Laws of Mercy"]

[Text] One month ago, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decided to form the Committee on Servicemen's Social Protection Issues under the Cabinet of Ministers. The unending line alongside Building No 6 on Bankovskaya Street speaks more eloquently than words about what hopes servicemen, and yes all people, are placing on this state organ.

Being independent from the Ministry of Defense and having the capability to hire the most authoritative and capable experts, the Committee has every opportunity to play a decisive role in the elimination of those defects that threaten our society.

Are our hopes destined to be justified? What is the Committee specifically involved with and who works on it? Our correspondent posed these questions to Committee Chairman Major-General Vilen Arutyunovich Martirosyan.

[Klyuchikov] What has the Committee managed to do during the short time that has passed since it was formed?

[Martirosyan] The primary efforts of the members of our committee have been concentrated in the following directions during the period that has passed:

Based on the prime minister's mission, we have developed a draft provision for the Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members" which defines the social security benefits mechanism for servicemen that are prescribed by law; the return to the homeland of servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens; and, the social adaptation and retraining of servicemen who have been released into the reserve.

However, although the work on these problems has demanded large expenditures of both time and energy from us, the list of our affairs is much broader.

So, we have assumed responsibility for participation in the solution of the housing problem. I want to point out that here we have succeeded in establishing close cooperation with Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Construction and Troop Billeting Directorate Chief Major-General V. Rudkovskiy. Jointly with him, we have requested an additional allocation of 20 billion rubles (R13.3 billion—for our own construction and R6.7 billion for joint construction) for the construction of housing for servicemen from Prime Minister V. Fokin.

This request found understanding in the government and the Ministry of Defense has already allocated an additional R750 million for this purpose during the first quarter.

The fact that we managed to enlist entrepreneurs for the creation of the servicemen's assistance fund, through which we plan to conduct cottage construction and retraining of servicemen who have been released into the reserve, is a serious success for the Committee.

[Klyuchikov] Participation in the development of draft laws takes a great deal of time. Doesn't this narrow the possibilities for meetings with people, many of whom see the Committee as nearly the sole defender of their rights?

[Martirosyan] The specific nature of our Committee's work requires continuous meetings with people. And it is impossible for us to complain about the number of visitors we receive. I alone have managed to receive more than 700 people during this period. But how many of them have passed through the offices of my associates! We have managed to restore nearly 300 illegally released officers to their posts.

People walk or drive to see us not only from various places in Ukraine but also from all the CIS states. I have insisted that the entry control system be simplified in order to facilitate their access to us. There are no passes or advance requests whatsoever. And it frequently turns out as follows: Having lost any hope of penetrating through the numerous barriers on the path to the high bosses, people come to us with their troubles. Even those complaints that are not associated with the army at all.

Maximum accessibility—this is the primary characteristic in the Committee's work. We have practically become the Committee for Charity and Hope.

However, you will not help people just through meetings in offices. Therefore, all associates regularly drive out to military units and educational institutions. So, they have become involved with stabilizing the situation at KVIRTU PVO [Kiev Air Defense Higher Radio Technical Engineering School], Kiev Higher Military Communications Engineering School, at Poltava Air Defense Communications School, and at Vasilkovskiy Military Aviation Technical School.

During that time, I have visited 14 oblasts and many cities of Ukraine. It is turning out that, if you try hard, you can manage to do a lot. Especially, if you exclude days off from your schedule. It is during these days that I manage to drive out on temporary duty assignments. And on Monday I am once again ready to receive the next visitors.

[Klyuchikov] The Committee's work attracts people not only because of accessibility but also because of the high professionalism of the specialists. What criteria have you used to select your team?

[Martirosyan] Military collectives have nominated their best representatives to work on the Committee and later

they are approved at a Union of Ukrainian Officers Plenum. Assignments are made only after that.

While becoming acquainted with my future associates, I attempt to rate them according to three primary criteria: competence, decency and the ability to share someone else's pain. This you know, is also a talent with which far from everyone has been endowed. It seems to me that the overwhelming majority of people on our Committee are these kinds of people. Major-General B. Lavrinenko, Colonels I. Khaletskiy, V. Stepanov, V. Nechiporuk—all of these people are responsive, profoundly decent and have the gift of compassion. Furthermore, they are high class professionals.

Yes and everyone can envy their capacity for work. There are no set limits to our work day. Each person works as much as he considers necessary, frequently until the last visitor leaves.

But, besides visitors, an enormous number of written appeals arrive at our offices on a daily basis. This stream is increasing many times over due to letters that have been sent from the staffs of the President, the Supreme Soviet, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Perhaps just the gigantic capacity for work of the associates of the general department headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Chechilo permits us to react to all of the appeals in a timely manner.

[Klyuchikov] How closely does the Committee cooperate with state and public organizations?

[Martirosyan] From our very first steps, our Committee has encountered support from the majority of government leaders. The President, despite all the pressure of work, reacts to our requests with sensitivity. We constantly encounter all possible support from Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman V. Durdinets. I like the relations that have developed with the Cabinet of Ministers.

And we would like very much for the Ministry of Defense, having relegated reciprocal complaints to the back burner, to establish harmonious relations of cooperation and mutual understanding with us.

From public organizations, I would very much like to note our close contacts with the Union of Ukrainian Officers and with the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. Activists from these organizations are directly participating in our work.

I must say one more thing. While working with peoples' complaints, we have the opportunity to consult with the most varied state institutions and to deal with the leaders of all ranks. And I am amazed at how strongly bureaucracy and an arrogant attitude toward simple people is entrenched in some of them. Too many people simply want to calmly sit at their desks which isolate them from problems and concerns. It is doubly sad when you encounter this phenomenon in certain Ministry of Defense offices.

We have always fought against these "desk commanders" and we will not grant them calm lives in the future. And the stronger the resistance that the Committee encounters, the more pro-active and aggressive our actions will be that are directed at the social protection of servicemen and their family members.

At the conclusion of our conversation, I would like to advise you to meet with the leaders of the Committee's structural subdivisions. This can help to give you a more complete idea of the nature of our work.

Colonel Vladimir Viktorovich Stepanov, Legal Department chief:

[Stepanov] The department has reviewed more than 330 appeals. The overwhelming number of them are associated the lack of an operating mechanism for recently adopted laws of Ukraine. This especially concerns the Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members." Specifically, mechanisms have not been developed to increase pensions through indexing and to grant monetary compensation to parents of servicemen who have died while performing military service. The directives on granting servicemen benefits for payment of housing and utilities have not reach the ZhEK [Housing Operations Office].

Quite a few complaints have been caused by commanders' lack of knowledge and lack of compliance with the laws of Ukraine. So, quite often they appeal to us with regard to violations of the housing law. There are cases when they refuse to place people on the apartment lists just because an officer has arrived from another CIS state.

In these cases, it is sufficient to explain to the unit commander the essence of the violations that have been permitted and the problem is eliminated. It is characteristic that not one repeat complaint has been registered which attests to the adequately high effectiveness of resolving servicemen's appeals.

Unfortunately, there have been cases when former servicemen attempt to obtain those benefits through our Committee to which they do not have a right. So, recently a Great Patriotic War disabled person attempted to get them to issue him a Zhiguli instead of the Zaporozhets with hand steering with payment at the old prices.

Such groundless appeals take a lot of our time, while diverting us from those servicemen whose rights have actually been violated.

Colonel of the Medical Service Fedor Dmitriyevich Tebehevskiy, Medical-Social Issues Department chief:

Many soldiers appeal to us who have been drafted into the army while ill. And also those servicemen who acquired a disease in the army but who were not subject to release according to the old USSR Ministry of Defense instructions. There have been quite a few cases when

soldiers, who have undergone in-hospital treatment, are being refused issuance of passes to Ukrainian Ministry of Defense sanatoriums.

Former servicemen appeal to us who cannot obtain documentation that their illnesses were associated with the performance of duty in high risk zones.

Based on the numerous proposals of our visitors, we, jointly with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Medical Support Services Directorate, have developed an amendment to the Law "On Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members".

Valentina Andreyevna Artamonova, chief of the Conscripts and Compulsory Service Military Personnel Department:

For the time being, we have neither authorized personnel, furniture, or even a telephone. It is unbearably difficult to work under these conditions. But we receive dozens of visitors every day and we drive out to "hot spots" where the sons of Ukraine are serving. This would have been impossible without the selfless assistance of members of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers.

If you spent even a day in our office, you would understand how much the people need our Committee. How much pain and tears, humiliation and despair people bring to us. How many more defects we now need to eradicate in our Ukrainian Armed Forces.

All of these disgraceful cases, and hundreds and thousands of them pass through us, convince us of the need to create, albeit at the oblast level, commissions for the social protection of servicemen.

Major-General Viktor Illarionovich Bochkarev, Armed Forces Directorate chief:

Our department received nearly 550 people during the last month. Eighty percent of the appeals concerned personnel issues. And first of all—the return to the homeland of servicemen who are Ukrainian citizens. The hopelessness and senselessness of their presence in "hot spots" is compelling officers to return even without official authorization. Quite recently, 10 officers who arrived from the Transcaucasus asked us to help them to be transferred or to at least be released from the Armed Forces since some of them have already found work for themselves in the national economy.

Our department, jointly with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Personnel Directorate, sent to the CIS Allied Armed Forces GUK [Main Personnel Directorate] and Commander-in-Chief's section nearly 300 requests for the transfer of servicemen to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As of today, we already have definite results.

Many servicemen request that our department explain some provision or other of housing or pension support. This is caused by the fact that frequently people poorly know the laws of Ukraine and at times these laws are disseminated to them in an incorrect interpretation.

Carpathian MD Commander on Relations with Officer Union, Housing

92UM0993A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Apr 92 p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen V. N. Stepanov, commander, Carpathian Military District, by Capt Yevgeniy Partin: "Our Duty—Defending the Cause of Ukraine Sovereignty"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are NARODNAYA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] The processes of reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine are gaining momentum. In addition to changes in the military doctrine and Armed Forces structure, new generals and officers are joining the ranks of troop leaders. These people in most cases offer considerable experience in serving in various capacities and diverse areas of the former Union.

Our newspaper has already provided the readers, under the rubric "Assignee's First Interview," with information on a number of responsible members of the Ministry of Defense and with representatives of military districts. In today's article we present Lieutenant General V. N. Stepanov, commander of the Carpathian Military District.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Every leader approaches his new duties with a plan of action he has prepared. You have been in the district commander's position for more than two months. What have you accomplished?

[Stepanov] Two months is not much time. Nevertheless, in these dynamic times of ours, with a proper approach it is possible to do quite a bit. I would like to start out by saying that I am not a newcomer to the district. It was not long ago that I commanded an army at Rovno. I enjoy a personal acquaintanceship with many district generals and officers. That is why I was able to find my bearings much more easily than someone from the "outside." Even at that, in the last few weeks I have been extremely busy. I have been able to spend some time in virtually all the units and large units of the PrikVO [Carpathian Military District]; quite a few times I got together with commanders and servicemen's families. I came across problems that are crying out loud for a solution - without exaggeration on my part - problems in need of immediate action.

Of great importance is the fact that, in this period of time, mutual understanding has been reached between district authorities and representatives of the President in oblasts located within the PrikVO. Discussions with the heads of local organs of authority highlighted the principal areas of cooperation between the military and civilian administrations and involved ways to improve social and living conditions on installations and posts. I wish to point out that, in most cases, the executive bodies and representatives of oblast councils appreciate the need for rendering assistance to construction of the Armed Forces.

One of the aspects of the work at hand involves systematic implementation of doctrinal guidelines and legislative acts designed to effect a transition to the new structure - the western operational command system. A cause of serious concern is the long-term factors affecting troop viability: maintaining the required level of combat and mobilizational readiness in units and large units; creating conditions conducive to improvement of professional skills on the part of servicemen; and strengthening of military discipline. The foregoing fundamental elements are associated with a host of efforts tied to the various levels of the military mechanism. It is my mission to see to it that this mechanism functions smoothly, uninterruptedly, and effectively.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Certain segments of the local mass media have it that circulating among the servicemen and part of the civilian population are rumors of existence in the district staff of opposition to you. It is being said that participating in the opposition are certain of your deputies and responsible workers of cadre organs and other elements.

[Stepanov] It is deplorable that there are some people wielding pens who look upon glasnost as permission to do anything at all, spreading rumors and printing unconfirmed information that is misleading to the public. Claims of existence of opposition inside PrikVO headquarters smack of lack of professionalism on the part of some journalists, to put it mildly.

I wish to say that, even when I was commander of the Rovno Army, I met personally with my district staff colleagues a number of times. The vast majority of the present generals and officers presently serving are high-caliber, literate people, devoted to the Ukraine. I certainly am making no secret of the fact that as I go along in my routine work I do come across incompetence on the part of some officers, ones unwilling to exercise conscientiousness in discharging their service duties. Personnel organs are taking action against this kind of serviceman. However, let me stress once again that such occurrences are more the exception than the rule.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] The housing problem is the most burning question on the minds of a considerable number of people in uniform. What are the ways for arriving at a speedy solution?

[Stepanov] Presently in the district there are 16,000 officers and warrant officers with no place to live. This situation cannot render anything other than a negative influence on servicemen's morale and their attitude toward the service. It must be realized that this shortage is not something that occurred all of a sudden. It is a predicament that grew worse with every passing year. The rate of construction is still being retarded by the economic crisis and the collapse of the former contractual ties. For this reason, the provision of apartments to all who request them will not be possible tomorrow or even the day after that.

However, the above does not mean that the district leadership is standing by idly, doing nothing to work on this urgent problem. We see a way out of the difficulty by using a multiple approach.

To begin with, we have requested the provision of special funding for housing construction by the Ukraine Ministry of Defense. We hope to receive monies from sales of our equipment, real property, and other assets, via the Commercial Center of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense. Second, we plan to expand construction of individual housing. We have reached agreements with local authorities regarding an increase in our contribution to urban construction. Of no little significance may be conditional exchange of apartments between servicemen within the framework of the CIS.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] In my conversations with officers and warrant officers in district units, I get the impression that their mood leaves something to be desired. Quite a few of them had entertained hopes that by taking the oath of allegiance to Ukraine their situation would change for the better. This has not been the case. What must be done so that servicemen will have a more hopeful outlook?

[Stepanov] I do not think that the situation is as dramatic as that. I do agree, however, that the mood in the officer ranks does leave something to be desired. It seems to me that this situation is not something unexpected; it consists of several factors. The former criteria have crumbled. Ukraine's Army is undergoing serious changes, starting with the manpower supply principle and ending with doctrinal guidelines. However, the Armed Forces have inherited many unresolved problems of the past. In this kind of situation, of prime importance is the need to change society's attitude toward the Army from a negative nature to the positive, to enhance the prestige of serving in the Armed Forces.

Finally, there is the resolution of problems which are those of the Army alone: the organization of combat training; implementation of strict observance of regulations; and introduction of training procedures via the new structures in the new environment.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] The Union of Ukraine Officers in the Army is becoming quite a force to reckon with. What is your personal opinion about it? What is the state of relations between the district authorities and the activists of the SOU [Union of Ukraine Officers]?

[Stepanov] I am not a member of the Union of Ukraine Officers. I can say, however, that this organization has made a substantial contribution to the matter of creating our state's Armed Forces. Unquestionably, its role in establishing the Ukrainian Army must increase. How is this to be accomplished? To begin with, the SOU members must instill in Ukraine Armed Forces personnel a conscientious attitude toward military service. With a spirit of professional competence, personal responsibility for the task at hand, and a zealous attitude toward

their military duty, they can promote the creation of a positive atmosphere in military collectives.

In connection with the rethinking of nonmaterial factors taking place and the urgent need for reviving Ukrainian military traditions, SOU activists should be invested with an important role in organizing patriotic education of conscripts. As soon as I commenced serving in my assignment as district commander, I started to develop good relations with the administration wherever district troops were stationed. I believe that relations with the Union of Ukraine Officers organizations will be just as good. In a recent meeting with Oleg Semenovitch Zelin-skiy, who is chairman of the Lvov area SOU, we discussed the major points whereby we can work together to implement the plans for constructing the Ukraine Armed Forces.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Are the laws passed by our Parliament sufficient for normal construction of the Ukraine Armed Forces?

[Stepanov] It is commonly known that Ukraine was the first CIS country to develop a legislative package designed to govern the creation of our own Armed Forces, dealing with: defense; Ukraine Armed Forces; universal military obligation and military service; social and legal protection for servicemen and their dependents; pension entitlement. What is worth noting is not the number of laws passed, but rather the development of a mechanism for implementing and exercising assurance over each provision. However, that is a matter for legislators, for the state apparatus. All of us - from private soldier to general - must possess a hope for the future, keeping in mind at all times - even in periods of difficulty - our duty to our people, which is to defend the cause of Ukraine's sovereignty.

Officer Union Forms Committee on Training

92UM1006A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
8 May 92 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Union of Ukraine Officers Conference Convened"]

[Text] On the agenda of a conference called by the SOU [Union of Ukraine Officers] is reform of Ukraine's military education system, military-related scientific research, and the SOU's role in implementation of the reform. This session is considered to be inaugural, since the union's structure calls for the creation of a special committee on military training which is to operate in close cooperation with its respective directorate of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense.

'Dedovshchina' Spurs Return of Deserters to Ukraine

92UM1003B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
5 May 92 p 2

[Article by Major Anatoliy Kolomiyets, Carpathian Military District: "And What's Under the Fig Leaf?"]

[Text] Khmelnytskyi Garrison Military Commissariat. At the entrance is a list of servicemen who are absent without leave from their units and who are refusing to serve on the territory of Ukraine. Simply speaking, they are deserters. Just who are they who have scorned the citizen's honorable duty? I asked Garrison Military Commandant Lieutenant Colonel A. Morozov that question.

"The problem of deserters is perhaps one of the most difficult which our young Armed Forces have encountered," said Aleksandr Lvovich. "I well understand the patriotic impulses of the young lads who are trying, through every possible legal and illegal method, to end up in their homeland from the various corners of the former Union. We cannot detain these young men for long in our country. Having received the order, they immediately leave for one of the assembly points where they determine a location for them to perform future service.

I personally talk with each deserter. And I frequently learn that things were not easy for them at their previous duty location. Insults, harassment of "dedy" [senior enlisted personnel—from "dedovshchina"—hazing of conscripts], and especially of representatives of so-called non-Russian nationalities. It is unfortunate that the former commanders of these soldiers closed their eyes to all of this scandal. Private M. Kovpak's sad story moved me. After the training subunit, Mikhail served near Baku. And instead of being involved with military matters, he was actually sold into slavery to a local citrus plantation owner for several months. Is it really worthwhile talking about any kind of moral foundations of his "fathers-commanders" and their officer honor?

The commandant cited quite a few other examples of desertion of soldiers from the army which frequently was their combat family only in words but in fact oppressed and morally and physically perverted them. But today another type of deserter has appeared. While hiding their unwillingness to serve outside the borders of Ukraine and having abandoned themselves to desertion, they do not hurry to come to the military commissariat but sit at their parents' or friends' homes. There are quite a few of those who frequently drink unrestrainedly or who drift in dubious company in search of adventure.

Like, for example, Private I. Shershen, who deserted from the Moscow suburbs. Having arrived at home, he literally from the first day abandoned himself to the fast life along with his pre-army friends. Military commissariat representatives and militia agents frequently called on Ivan's mother in order to learn where her son was hiding. But the unhappy woman only wept. There were reasons for this. "Well just betray me—I will beat you!"—that's approximately what the son told his mother after his last stroll.

Fortunately, the matter has not been reduced to a criminal case. They somehow managed to catch Shershen and send him back to the garrison stockade. While looking at his eyes that were wet from tears and while

listening to the arrested soldier's trembling voice, it was hard to believe that he had held his own mother in fear until quite recently. "I will serve honorably, just forgive me,"—the deserter anticipated each of my questions with these words. How pitiful he was. I did not believe that the primary reason for his desertion from the unit had become, in his words, "dedovshchina."

Private A. Stetsyuk, who deserted from St. Petersburg, also was unable to realize the opportunity to serve in Ukraine. All three attempts, and that is how many times he was given an order for leaving his unit, turned out to be failures. And the natural result—the procurator's sanction for his arrest.

The service of Private D. Afanasyev—a distinctive record holder—is also developing unsuccessfully. Before he ended up in Ukraine, he managed to serve in the Transbaykal, Turkestan, and Far Eastern military districts. Recently, the soldier was in the stockade three times: for sleeping at his post and for being absent without leave. This man, as they say, is under charges. And his father, a reserve lieutenant colonel, interrupts the commandant with irate phone calls and threatens to seek justice against all of those who offend the "innocent" child. And this is instead of saying thank you to the officer who after numerous requests helped get his son assigned to serve near his parent's home.

It happens that some servicemen, who are deserting from other sovereign republics, are not always motivated by a desire to honorably serve Ukraine. The commandant told me about one seaman from the Baltic Fleet. He made friends with some riff-raff to whom he promised to bring two pistols from the unit in exchange for payment. Having received a down payment, he rapidly squandered it. And when it came time to deliver what he had promised, he left them holding the bag. And just in time. His acquaintances turned out to be hard lads. Having summoned up the gall, they went to see the unit commander to demand the money they had given to the seaman.

I especially want to say something about those people who have not served anywhere, except in Ukraine. But a passion for travel has called them to the road. So, they have been looking for Private A. Dyachenko, who had served in Lvov, since July 1991. A criminal case has been filed against him. Private V. Ilin, who deserted from Donetsk, has departed for parts unknown. Private V. Tesa, the son of a reserve warrant officer, deserted from Drogobych in Lvov Oblast and was arrested at his parents' home. The parents were quite complacent with regard to their son's flight, although they knew that he was not on leave when he came home. Indeed, having served the appropriate amount of time in the stockade, Vladimir still took the oath to the Ukrainian people and returned to his unit. I would like to believe that he will remain at it until the end of his service.

I could talk about deserters for quite a while. They are using demagogic cock-and-bull stories about "dedovshchina," poor commanders, and pacifism just like a fig leaf to hide their lack of discipline, immorality, and the desire to avoid the slightest difficulties of army life. But as we all know, a fig leaf is an unreliable cover. It is too bad that neither the deserters themselves nor their parents understand that. If only one of them thought how much these "tours" are costing the state? What damage they are inflicting on unit combat readiness and the moral and material damage to the officers whose duty time is involved with searches for deserters? Lieutenant Colonel A. Morozov wanted to say that in his speech on local television. But obviously not everyone thinks the problem of desertion from the army is serious enough. In any case, television screen workers managed to allocate only three minutes of air time to the commandant.

"Many people simply do not know the laws," complained Aleksandr Lvovich. "And therefore, there is a consciousness of impunity for their deeds. Of course, we need to toughen the liability for desertion from service. But we cannot even get by here without material liability, all the more so in a difficult time."

The commandant suggested we force deserters and their parents to totally reimburse the expenses caused by absence without leave from units and by searches. Add a fine to this. Then "journeys" will become too expensive for both the sons and the parents. But as long as tenderhearted mamas and papas in rows go to an officer with a demand to reassign their deserter children closer to home... And how much work time is consumed by fruitless conversation!

"And can military commissariat associates do much so that the deserters do not have extended voyages?"

"Alas, our capabilities are limited," admitted Aleksandr Lvovich. "Judge for yourself. The military commissariat's transportation, as they say, has one foot in the grave. Both vehicles spend more time being repaired than on the road. Garrison unit commanders frequently assign untrained, physically weak servicemen to patrols. Therefore, patrols rarely find a slovenly dressed or drunken soldier. I think that the military commissariat must include a special sub-unit which performs patrol duty at a professional level and effectively reacts to any disorders.

"Taking advantage of this opportunity, I would like to express my appreciation through the newspaper to Senior Warrant Officer Gennadiy Svishev who has credit for quite a few detained deserters. When he sets out on patrol, I know that there will be order on his route. Or take, by way of illustration, Privates Vasilii Nizhnik and Ruslan Trush. Both Spetsnaz [special forces] soldiers were forced to come to Ukraine from "hot spots." I can depend on them for everything. Here is an example for you. Recently they helped me to call 35 soldiers and sergeants who had not taken the oath to order at the train station. It is these kinds of lads who must serve at the military commissariat."

I will not hurry to end my story. The garrison military commandant is correct. He really needs good vehicles and strong lads. We need to toughen the liability for desertion from service. But, I am convinced that we will not solve the problem of deserters only through these steps. Here the joint efforts of society and the army are required for the revival of the heroic traditions of the Ukrainian people, the cultivation of a feeling of high responsibility for the defense of their Homeland among young people. So that a young man who has placed his signature under the text of the oath does not consider this act to be a simple formality, but understands the state significance of the step he has taken. And much here depends on the parents. They and only they are the first to form their children's attitudes toward the soldier's duty. But for now...

Wouldn't you like to help yourself to a cigarette?

Turning around, I caught sight of a soldier. A tired glance. An unshaven face. Rumpled uniform. In his hand—a tightly crammed cellophane packet. It seemed like this was one more victim of remote wanderings.

I did not manage to ask him anything. Having caught sight of a patrol, the soldier jumped on a passing trolley bus...

Work Begins on Housing For Western Forces Troops

92UM1003A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
5 May 92 p 1

[Article by Major Vladimir Kamenetskiy: "News from the Carpathian Military District"]

[Text]

Novoselye—for the New Year!

The housing construction program for servicemen who have been withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces is beginning to be implemented. So, on April 29, 1992, a rally, dedicated to laying the "first stone" of the new military garrison, occurred in the city of Starokonstantinov.

In their speeches, the Ukrainian President's Representative for Khmelnytskyi Oblast Yevgeniy Guselnikov, Rayon Center Administration Head Dmitriy Shvalyuk, Carpathian Military District Commander Lieutenant-General Valeriy Stepanov, Major Yevgeniy Murygin and Orthodox Church Dean to Starokonstantinov Father Vladimir thanked the government of Germany and the Bulgarian workers for the assistance in developing an infrastructure for our troops. In his turn, Hohtif-AG Construction Firm Director Karl Renberg and main subcontractor Glavbolgarstroy General Director Stefan Peshev assured the officers, warrant officers and their family members that the keys to the 1,282 apartments will be handed over to them no later than December 31, 1992.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Decree on Call-Up, Release of Troops

92UM1007A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 18 Apr 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Azerbaijan of 17 April 1992
dealing with call-up and discharge of eligible male citizens]

[Text]

DECREE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

CALL-UP OF CITIZENS OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC FOR ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE PERIOD APRIL - JUNE 1992, AND DISCHARGE INTO THE RESERVE OF SOLDIERS, SEAMEN, SERGEANTS, AND RANKING NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHO HAVE COMPLETED THEIR TERM OF SERVICE

In accordance with the Law on Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic, to supply manpower for the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic and other military elements provided for in Azerbaijan Republic legislation, I do hereby **DECREE**:

1. To call up for active military service, in the period April - June of 1992, citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic born in the years 1965 to 1974 attaining the age of 18 years by the day of call-up and who are not entitled to deferment, to serve in the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic and in other military elements provided for by Azerbaijan Republic legislation, with the term of service as follows:

Two years, in the case of seamen and petty officers of ships of the Caspian Flotilla;

Eighteen months, in the case of other soldiers, sergeants, and ranking noncommissioned officers.

Also to be called up in the abovementioned period of time are citizens of draft age for assignment to alternative service (in fulfillment of the labor obligation).

2. To discharge into the reserve in the period April - June of 1992 those soldiers, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, and ranking noncommissioned officers who have completed the established term of active service, and conscripts who are citizens of the Azerbaijan Republic and have served 18 months and longer and have been transferred to the Azerbaijan Republic from other republics.

3. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic is to take the measures provided for by law to implement this Decree.

[Signed] Acting President
Azerbaijan Republic
Chairman Supreme Council
Azerbaijan Republic
Ya. MAMEDOV
Baku, 17 April 1992

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Officer-Short Kazakhs Contemplate Problem of Forming Army

92US0441A Alma-Ata YEGEMENDI QAZAQSTAN
in Kazakh 14 Feb 92 p 3

[Article by Baqtiyar Yerimbet: "How Many Officers Do the Kazakhs Have? What Means Do We Have to Increase Their Numbers?"]

[Text] The fact that the republics of the former Union are achieving their independence, and are beginning to divide up into separate nations, has placed many problems before us. One of the most complex, and most important, is the military question. If we approach present circumstances with a critical eye, we note that two types of views have arisen regarding the question. The first is that, in this time of transition, the military of the former Soviet era is to be used, that is to say, that CIS unified forces are to be maintained, and that we should rely on them in difficult times such as today. The second is that the republics, as independent states, should form separate armies. Whereas the first view has been born out of the needs of the time of transition, the second view looks to the future. In this connection what potentialities does Kazakhstan have? Is there a basis for Kazakhstan to form its own army? Is there sufficient finance, a sufficient material and technical base, and sufficient personnel for this? What is the level of preparation of national cadres, and what is their present function in the army? We think that everyone will be concerned about these questions.

If we set out to form a separate army in the future, we, like others, have every right to demand from Russia that the military bases on Kazakh territory, weapons stored in our lands, and the technology be turned over to us. The reason is that Kazakhstan has made no small contribution towards bringing the armed forces to their present levels. This is no fantasy. We think that, from this point of view, the material and technical basis of the formerly established Soviet Army, the weapons, the arms plants and other points, will become the basis for a newly established republic army. In addition, we will have to find other sources of finance. We hope that such a state of affairs will make possible the elimination of material and technical base and armaments deficiencies. However, will this mean that the question has been solved? Will not this material and technical base require specialists knowledgeable about weapons and technology?

Indeed, it is well known that implied in this question is the idea that "we cannot just sit on our hands." In fact, the shortage of national cadres weighs upon us heavily. If the process of formation of independent armies in the republics of CIS goes forward, and if each of them invites their own military specialists to come to their countries, will national cadres, Kazakhstan officers, be able to replace them? Indeed that is the gist of the problem. Today we are the weakest nation in this respect. National

cadres reaching the level whereby they can form the framework of an individual army in the future remains only a hope at present.

—Under present circumstances, essentially three preconditions must be met to form a well-prepared, complete army. They are: finance, weapons and cadres. If any one is lacking, the army will be an incomplete army. In particular, military specialists are the most powerful force for breathing "life" into a "lifeless" army. Without military specialists, it is not possible to have any kind of military force. So stated Colonel Abay Tasbolatov, a person who has done a great deal of research on the army cadre question. He is division chief of the Republic of Kazakhstan State Defense Committee. It would be proper to call this officer, who, in his time, has graduated from military school, and later from the military academy, and who has distinguished himself in preparing offices, a specialist in investigating national military cadres problems. At present Abay is preparing to defend his doctoral dissertation on a military theme. We have met him several times, and exchanged views.

According to what Abay has said, the percentage of Kazakh officers in the present unified military forces (other than border troops) is "not enough to wash one's hands with." More specifically, the **number of Kazakh officers is only about 3,000**, from lieutenant to general (not including retired and reserve officers), at the present moment. There is **not a single general** commanding a division, army or military okrug among them. Even in the case of colonels, there are only about 50 total. Some of these 50 are giving lessons in military academies and schools, and the others are serving in military organizations. There are very few serving in the army in a direct command role.

Let me give a few specific examples below to show what these figures actually mean. According to generally established military rules, a division comprises from 8,000 to 12,000 men, more or less. If Kazakhstan forms its own army, it must maintain at least something like 50-60,000 troops. This means some 5-6 divisions.

This being the case, could the 3,000 Kazakh officers mentioned above currently serving manage five divisions?

—No,—says Colonel A. Tasbolatov.—The 3,000 officers would only be sufficient to control one division. And even then it would not be easy to collect them all together in one place. In order to concentrate these officers, each with their own functions, into a single division, a great deal of effort and money would have to be expended.

We can make clear the paucity of military specialists from Kazakhstan through many other facts. For example, this fact. Until 1 December, 1990, there were only **99 Kazakh officers** attending the institutes, academies, and faculties of the former Union and **receiving lessons in order to improve their knowledge**. No one can doubt that this is a matter of there being only five grains

in a whole sack of wheat. However, based on this, we will try to solve the problem of providing national cadres to the army.

There is, I think, no reason not to call to mind a conversation of a group of people's deputies presented to viewers through television only recently. During this discussion, devoted to the results of the session of the Supreme Council, Republic of Kazakhstan People's Deputy Sherkhan Murtaza answered a question by saying: "We see one aspect of the treacherous and insidious acts of a great power empire through this military question. They did not ever patronize the military ranks and grades of representatives of other nationalities, among them, of Kazakhs. For this reason, Kazakhs were not promoted beyond the rank of colonel. Behind all of this is a policy of major swindling." The above mentioned facts are proof.

Looking at the essence of cadre preparation, the foundation is in special schools-boarding schools, and in military secondary schools designed for military training. Educational institutions of this sort have not, strictly speaking, been organized in the republic. However, there are specialized schools-boarding schools for military subjects in Almaty, Qaraghandy and Shymkent cities. More than 300 young students study and learn in each of them. Each year more than 250 children graduate from such schools. One benefit given to those who have completed such schools is that they are accepted without examination to high command military schools.

—Just three specialist schools-boarding schools in which only around 3000 study are very few for such a large republic as Kazakhstan. In my view, I think it necessary that such educational establishments be established in every oblast center, and in all other large cities. **Moreover, not just 300, but more than 600-700 young students should study in such schools.**— Thus stated Colonel Kim Serikbayev, hitherto chief of the Almaty Bawyrzhan Momyshtuly atyndaghy school-boarding school, now military counselor of the chairman of the republic State Defense Committee.—Likewise, we must pay particular attention to having these schools accept more representatives of local nationalities. To be sure, at present these schools are primarily attended by Kazakh children. However, since we are now a separate nation, we must increase the numbers of Kazakhs attending.

Moreover, it is very inappropriate to say that we are rich when we say that "we have three schools-boarding schools," where only completely outstanding young people study and are educated. In addition, the young people graduating from these schools-boarding schools are generally drawn elsewhere. **It appears that only 25-30 of them at most are accepted by schools in our republic.**

—I think the situation good. When I was a student at the Almaty Higher General Military Command School, only some 10-13 children were accepted each year from the schools mentioned. During the last academic year some

20 children were accepted. This has only happened due to our intervention,—said A. Tasbolatov.

Here, as already noted above, we clearly feel the “fatherly concern” of empire. In particular, why are graduates from the schools-boarding schools not accepted by one of the two military schools in the capital?

Just like the Bukharan song: “We are going to the Balkans, these are the mountains we are going to,” the place where graduates from military schools-boarding schools are going to is only one place, the military secondary schools. **There are two such schools in Almaty.** We need note that **there are 34 military secondary schools and academies in Ukraine.** With such potential, if they cannot form their own army, who can? With 1000 students studying in each of them, they prepare each year at least 10,000, more or less.

Above all, we have depended on the Almaty Higher General Military Command School. This year is the 21st anniversary of its foundation. Starting last year a department to prepare commanders in motorized armor-tank specialties was established in this educational institution, which has by and large been involved in preparing commanders for general military units. One group is now studying there in this department.

—About 1000 cadets are studying in the school. About 250 specialized teachers are instructing them. Students are accepted without regard to ethnic affiliation. Their numbers are on the increase. This year the school accepted **5-6 children more**, compared to last year, from the schools-boarding schools.—So said Lieutenant-colonel L. Marchenko, acting assistant chief of the school.

As the discussion went on, the question: “How many of the students are from Kazakhstan, how many are Kazakhs among them?” was repeated again and again. And in fact, noting that “there is no need” to write such figures in the newspapers, he explained everything. Thus it turned out that **there are only 6 Kazakh officers among the teachers. And only 84 of the thousand cadets are Kazakhs.** He thought that perhaps a total of 60-70 percent of the students in all were from Kazakhstan. I understood why he was a little hesitant, and I was, moreover, ashamed. Representatives of the Kazakh nationality studying in schools in the capital of Kazakhstan are barely 10 percent.

I have observed that educational work is put on a good foundation in schools where the composition of the faculty and material bases are considered better. In addition, military units associated with the school do everything possible to help cadets refine their knowledge in practice. Working to achieve this there are colonels P. Yermekbayev and Zh. Abildayev, lieutenant-colonels S. Imandiyev, and instructors N. Ysmaghulov and T. Rysbayev. We went to talk to two of them.

Zhaqyp Yerelkhanuly Abildayev, who spoke Kazakh fluently, was a well-informed, educated man. He had graduated from a military tank school, the history faculty of the Qyrghyz University, and the Lenin imeni Military Academy in Moscow. He defended his doctoral dissertation while in that academy. He now heads the social sciences chair of the Almaty school.

—To understand why there is a lot of water, or a little, flowing, it is necessary to go upstream to the sources. Thereby one finds out about everything blocking the flow. Similarly, to answer the question “Why are Kazakh officers few?”, you must start with the beginning,—said Zhaqyp.—When I look into the question, I note that work to propagandize and agitate military specialties among Kazakh young people has been extremely weak. One does not hear the words “become a commander, become an officer” from the mouths of parents in local areas. On the contrary, what they say is: “If you become an officer, you will become too Russian and move away.” They say to most of their children: “Become a director, become a manager.” What they say has great influence on these young people. We have things we emphasize, things we do not emphasize. We must think about this carefully. A second reason is the language question. Instruction in all the military secondary schools is in one language only. This is in and of itself a major barrier. How many problems has this created for us in the past. The critical element of a third reason resides in the system of rayon military commissars. This is because one can gain entry to the school only through the military commissars. The selection of young people, in particular, care shown for the children of the representatives of the local nationality, is problematical. In my view, unless we eliminate these problems, we will not achieve proper success in preparing national cadres.

—I have two suggestions in regard to this problem,—said Lieutenant-colonel Sayat Moldashuly Imandiyev, who also took part in the discussion. He is a graduate of military school and later of the Lenin imeni Military Academy. He is now a graduate student in the Kazakh State Pedagogical University.—First,—if we are to refine as much as possible the preparation of national cadres, we must not be sparing of funds. If needed, we must send them to study in foreign academies. For example, there are those coming from America to study in the military school in Panama. They in fact learn everything. Nothing would be better than to put this experience to work in Kazakhstan. Second,—knowledgeable Kazakh officers in other places should be invited and concentrated here. There are some very experienced Kazakh officers giving lessons in academies even in Moscow. Such officers can be found in other places too. The time has perhaps even come to take in hand work to fill up the schools here with Kazakh cadres.

—What Sayat says is right; if you mention “Kazakhs,” I also know a person who has been sent to a God-forsaken place. This is Lieutenant-colonel Saylawbek

Baymenov, who teaches in a military institute in Moscow. He is involved in creating a Russian-Kazakh dictionary of military terms. The book is finished, it may or may not be published. In truth, we are far behind in such things. The time has come to give military orders in Kazakh,—said Zh. Abildayev.—Let us touch on the language question here. We need to gradually introduce the use of the Kazakh language in our military secondary schools. As has been said previously, when we have solved the problem of a Kazakh-Russian military dictionary, and of translating technical literature, it would be suitable to introduce everything into the instructional program. I have offered my proposal about this to the republic State Defense Committee. Another thing, there is the need to form a group under the committee directly concerned with this question.

To tell the truth, we have thought that we would not be able to find such people in the Almaty school. Although rare, we rejoice that military specialists like these men exist. Unfortunately, it would seem as if these lads have suffered for what they have done. Colonel Zh. Abildayev has lived in a dormitory for four years with his two children, while Lieutenant-colonel S. Imandiyev rents an individual apartment with his one child. "Housing has gotten very expensive. I do not know what I will do," he said, vexed. How dear are the people with whom I live in my own nation and land!

The views of the two young men who know military affairs well seemed very audacious in their straightforwardness. According to what they said, the three military schools—boarding schools, particularly the military schools—boarding schools in Almaty, should be turned into a primary base for cadres of the Almaty secondary school. All the cadets in the school should, as a rule, be only from Kazakhstan. Among them, at least 70 percent should be comprised of representatives of the local nationality. Without officers with a higher education, it will be impossible to maintain an independent army. For that reason, it would be appropriate if the President would make the opening of a military academy of Almaty his direct responsibility. However, for the time being, we must send officers to study elsewhere, even to academies in foreign countries.

It has not been especially difficult to get into the Almaty military border secondary school, which has had "an open door" to many in its time. There were only three such schools in the former Soviet Union. One was in Moscow, the second in Kalitsin City and the third in Almaty. The school in Almaty is now controlled by the CIS Committee for the Protection of the Frontiers. Who will have control in the future those in the school themselves do not know.

Hoping to "meet the head of the school," after getting the brush off for several days from his assistant, Colonel A. Koval, I finally was unable to see him. Koval said very superfluously: "Let me tell you what you need to know." However, this man could tell me very little.

—Nearly 1000 cadets study in the school. More than 200 teachers instruct them. Each year some 300 cadets graduate and receive their own commands. About half of the cadets are from Kazakhstan. However, Kazakhs are something like one-fifth of the cadets,—said the colonel.

This person, like L. Marchenko in the Higher General Command School, shook his head and said: "We favor members of the local nationality, and in general students from Kazakhstan, when we accept students." However, we doubted it. After talking with others, we found out that the Kazakhs among the ranks of the cadets were about 50. Thus their numbers are only about 5 percent. **Only 5 of every 100 cadets are Kazakhs.** If, as already noted, it is true that "Some half of the cadets are from Kazakhstan," then who are these people? If the day is ever to come when we will be defending our own borders, how will border officers prepared at a 5 percent level be enough staffing?

—The rest, be it as it may, the level of preparation of national cadres in the military is very low. I myself am a graduate of a military secondary school. After that I studied in the Kuybyshev imeni Military Academy. At that time there were only three Kazakh officers in the entire academy. Afterwards the three of us went three different directions,—said Lieutenant-colonel Yermek Mutanuly Mergenghaliyev, an instructor of the border school.—I myself was on military service for four years in Afghanistan. Now, subsequently, when I have come to Almaty, there are only seven Kazakhs in the school, like once in the school in Moscow. Under such conditions, it is difficult to speak about national cadres, about teaching in the Kazakh language in the military secondary schools. **Just like the proverb, "for five donkeys in the herd, more is needed than just a speck of land,"** it would seem to be too early to discuss the question of organization of a national army. Even if we are talking in terms of all the people of Kazakhstan, it will be no easy thing to organize an army. But there is no other way. To return to the topic at hand. We must set about forming an army, with conditions as they are. This being the case, we must deal with the question of filling it up, and strengthening it with national cadres.

We should look at the matter of the "growth" rate of Kazakh officers, and what level "work" to prepare national cadres should be at, in terms of the above facts. To be sure, if things remain as they are, there can be no discussion of a republic army, or of a national army in the future. For that reason, as a group of Kazakh officers themselves say, **we must somehow achieve the following: Military subject schools—boarding schools must be opened in every oblast center and large city. Large numbers of representatives of the local nationality must be accepted by them. The Higher General Military Command and Higher Military Border Secondary Schools must be transferred to the direct control of the Republic of Kazakhstan State Defense Committee. Military-aviation schools to prepare fliers must be opened. A Republic of Kazakhstan**

Military Academy must be opened to teach higher officer material, and to refine their specialties. In connection with this, we should reorganize the work of military commissariats, and resolve the issue of filling them up with national cadres. Only then will we be able to increase the number of Kazakh officers.

In any case, we indeed think that events are moving favorably, and "we are going to stretch our legs." There will be a great deal of discussion about this question today at the meeting of CIS representatives being held in Minsk. We hope that this meeting will understand which way the wind is blowing.

Turkmenistan Minister on Caspian Fleet

92UM0992A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 17 Apr 92 p 1

[TURKMEN PRESS report: "Turkmenistan Claiming Caspian Flotilla?"]

[Text] According to ITAR-TASS reports arriving from Baku on discussions and consultations being held there by military experts on the subject of partitioning of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla, Turkmenistan is very definite in its position on this issue.

A TURKMEN PRESS correspondent requested Turkmenistan Minister of Defense D. Kopekov to furnish his comments in this regard.

[Kopekov] We did not participate in the talks in Baku, but we do have our own position on this question. Our CIS colleagues are aware of it.

As far as the military aspect of this question is concerned, we lay no claims to the Caspian Flotilla. Turkmenistan has no intention of waging a war against anyone; that is our fundamental position.

Something else I would like to say is that we would not fail to lay claim to that portion of the funds—a substantial amount at that—which we gave for the creation of the naval arm, be that the Caspian Flotilla, the Northern Fleet, or any other fleet. In this connection, if the question becomes one of dividing up the property belonging to the Caspian Flotilla, we will submit a demand for our share.

In the event an agreement is reached to maintain the integrity of the flotilla's forces and employ its assets for the common interest, we will give preference to this aspect.

MOLDOVA

Presidential Decree on Troop Relocation

925D0368A Chisinau MOLDOVA SUVERANA
in Moldovan 2 Apr 92 p 1

[Presidential Decree issued on 31 March 1992 in Chisinau]

[Text]

Decree by the President of the Republic of Moldova on the Repatriation of Moldovan Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Conscripts Recruited from the Republic, for the Purpose of Continuing Their Military Service

With a view to implementing the laws of the Republic of Moldova dealing with the Armed Forces and with the Moldovan citizens' military duties and service, I decree:

1. The government of the Republic of Moldova will ensure the repatriation of military men who are Moldovan citizens from the other CSI member states and from the Republic of Georgia, in keeping with their desire to continue serving in their homeland:

—Conscripts—by 15 May 1992

—Officers and non-commissioned officers—individually and in conjunction with the defense ministries of the CSI member states and of the Republic of Georgia, and with the CSI Armed Forces Command, by the end of 1992.

2. The Defense Ministry of the Republic of Moldova will organize the transportation home of the conscripts who will be returning from wherever their units are based, and will create the necessary conditions for the organized return of officers and non-commissioned officers and their family members who expressed a desire to return to the homeland.

The necessary conditions must be ensured for the military men in question to continue their military service on the territory of the republic.

3. The present decree will come into effect on its date of publication.

[Signed] Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova
31 March 1992, Chisinau

Law on Republic's Armed Forces

925D0368B Chisinau MOLDOVA SUVERANA
in Moldovan 4 Apr 92 p 2

[Law of the Republic of Moldova on the Armed Forces, issued in Chisinau on 17 March 1992]

[Text] The republic of Moldova will build up its Armed Forces in accordance with its military doctrine.

Chapter I: General Principles

Art. 1—The duties of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova are designed to defend the state in case of armed aggression and to ensure the inviolability of its borders and its air space.

The Armed Forces may become involved in settling matters that do not have a direct bearing on ensuring the country's defense only on the basis of a Parliament decision, and in extreme situations, on the basis of a decree issued by the president of Moldova.

Art. 2—Principles for the establishment of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces will be established in accordance with the following principles:

- Regular troops will be maintained, which will be supplemented by combined military draft and volunteer citizens' enrollment on the basis of a contract;
- Military reserves will be trained on the basis of the citizens' military obligations;
- The Army command will be uniform and centralized;
- A permanent state of combat preparedness and mobilization will be ensured;
- State social and legal protection will be provided for military men;
- The troops will be educated in a spirit of love for the Fatherland, respect for the law, and democratic ideals.

Chapter II: Armed Forces Structure and Command

Art. 3—Armed Forces structure

The Armed Forces will be made up of regular troops and trained reserves.

The basis of the regular army will consist of ground troops, anti-air defense, and military air force.

The reserves will be made up of first class reserves, designed to supplement the regular troops prior to a state of war, and second class reserves of units and subunits designed to independently carry out military actions.

The structure, troops, equipment, and financial and technical-material resources of the Armed Forces will be decided by the Ministry of Defense and the government and approved by Parliament.

Art. 4—State leadership of the Armed Forces

The supreme command of the Armed Forces will be exercised by Parliament and the president of the Republic of Moldova, who also serves as supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and by the government, within the limits of the prerogatives envisaged by law.

The Defense Ministry is the central body of state leadership of the Armed Forces and is directly in charge of their command.

The Defense Ministry will work out the major lines of military policy, the draft build-up plan of the Armed Forces, and the mobilization plan for the Armed Forces

in coordination with the plan for economic mobilization. The ministry will also decide the republic's defense needs, and in accordance with those needs it will oversee the provision of the military units with weapons, military equipment, and other material means. The Defense Ministry will cooperate with the armed forces of other states and will ensure social and legal protection for the military men and their family members.

The Defense Ministry's powers for managing the Armed Forces are envisaged in the present law, the Defense Law, and other legislative acts.

The Defense Ministry will be headed by a defense minister. The minister will be appointed by Parliament upon the recommendation of the president of the Republic of Moldova.

Upon the issue of a decree by the president of the Republic of Moldova, the defense minister will place the Armed Forces on highest alert, declare general mobilization, and order the troops to be used according to their designation.

The defense minister will command the troops through the Armed Forces General Staff, which is directly under his command.

Art. 5—Military command of the Armed Forces

The military command of the Armed Forces is provided by the Armed Forces General Staff.

The Armed Forces General Staff is directly in charge of preparing the troops to carry out the military actions required to ensure the republic's defense.

The General Staff is in charge of providing:

- Combat training and mobilization plans for the Armed Forces;
- Measures for the deployment of the regular troops and reserves, and the most efficient methods of utilizing the units and subunits in combat;
- Military strategies and tactics, cooperation between the regular army on the one hand and the reserves, border guards, and Interior Ministry troops on the other;
- Long-term planning regarding weapons and military technology procurement;
- Regulations and instructions, and combat training programs and plans for the Armed Forces.

The General Staff will ensure:

- Direct leadership of the activities of the military command bodies subordinated to it;
- Troops leadership and secure contact with the troops in times of both peace and war;
- The promotion of a cadres policy among the troops;

—Control over how the orders and instructions of the superior bodies of state leadership and military command are carried out by the troops.

Chapter III: Deployment and supplementation of the Armed Forces

Art. 6—Armed Forces deployment

The deployment and redeployment of the Armed Forces will proceed in accordance with the military doctrine and the general strategy mapped out for the defense of the republic.

Art. 7—Supplementation of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces will be supplemented in accordance with the law on the military obligations and service of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

Moldovan citizens will be accepted in the Armed Forces service regardless of their nationality and religion.

While serving in the regular troops of the Armed Forces, the military men are not permitted to belong to any party or other social or political organization.

The Armed Forces will be supplemented by military men outside the republic's territory [exteritorial], and by conscripts and reservists on the territory of the republic.

The supplementation will be based on:

—The military obligations of citizens who served their compulsory military training, who are drafted for military service, and who are in the Armed Forces reserves.

—Volunteer enrollment under contract.

The general management of the process of supplementation of the Armed Forces will be carried out by the government; the selection and assignment of draftees will be carried out by the local bodies of military command.

Chapter IV: Economic resources of the Armed Forces

Art. 8—Financial resources

The financial resources of the Armed Forces will be ensured in accordance with the laws and regulations, out of state budget allocations. Resources will be distributed for the maintenance and training of the troops, armament and combat technology procurement, scientific research, testing and planning, construction, capital investment projects, pensions, and compulsory state insurance for the troops and for people on military training.

Art. 9—The state will be in charge of ensuring the technical-material needs of the Armed Forces.

All military projects and facilities, all categories of armament, military technology, and other military assets are property of the state managed by the Armed Forces,

which will exercise the right of possession, utilization, and disposition of those assets on the basis of and within the limits established by law.

The state command will also be in charge of the production, supply, and repair of armaments, military technology, spare parts, and other items; providing foodstuffs for the defense system; scientific research, testing, and planning defense projects; creating, developing, and maintaining mobilization facilities; stockpiling state and mobilization reserves of material assets.

The fulfillment of state defense orders will be facilitated by means of fiscal, credit, and other benefits.

Art. 10—Utilization of state property

Land will be assigned on a permanent or temporary basis for defense needs, in the manner envisaged in the land stock legislation.

The bodies of local self-administration will be compensated for any losses caused by the assignment and utilization of land for defense needs in keeping with the law.

Buildings, facilities, various property, and other assets may be conveyed to the Armed Forces for defense needs, in the manner established by the law.

State property, capital assets, and buildings earmarked for the Armed Forces, for defense purposes, and for mobilization assignments may not be transferred to private or collective ownership or be sold or purchased.

Chapter V: The Status of Other States' Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova

Art. 11—The status of other states' armed forces

The status and conditions for the deployment of units and subunits belonging to other states' armed forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova will be decided on the basis of the relevant intergovernmental and international agreements.

[Signed] Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova
Chisinau, 17 March 1992

Republic's Defense Law

925D0369A Chisinau MOLDOVA SUVERANA
in Moldovan 4 Apr 92 p 2

[Defense Law of the Republic of Moldova, issued in Chisinau on 17 March 1992]

[Text] The defense of the Republic of Moldova in one of the most important functions of the state and in case of armed aggression it becomes the cause of the entire people.

Moldova's defense potential, troops, structure, equipment, and training of the Armed Forces will be related to

the nature of the outside military threat and will be organized in line with the state's military doctrine.

The present law will provide the foundation for the organization and unfolding of the country's defense, the responsibilities of the bodies of state power and state administration, and the duties of the citizens and the decisionmaking factors of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, with a view to strengthening Moldova's defense capability.

Chapter I: General Provisions

Art. 1—Defense foundation

The defense of the Republic of Moldova consists of the totality of political, economic, and military measures designed to ensure the sovereignty and territorial independence of the republic, defend the state's interests, and ensure a peaceful life for the people.

The defense of the Republic of Moldova is based on preparing the population, the economy, and its Armed Forces for the military defense of the state.

Art. 2—Defense organization

The defense organization includes:

- Mapping out a military policy and doctrine and developing the military science;
- Coordinating military and political efforts with other countries with a view to preempting military aggression and reducing the danger of a possible armed threat from the outside;
- Preparing and ensuring the structure and necessary size of the Armed Forces and keeping up a high level of combat and mobilization preparedness;
- Providing the Armed Forces with weapons and military technology, logistics supplies, and other technical-material resources in the necessary quantities;
- Ensuring human mobilization reserves for times of war;
- Preparing the economy for mobilization and the bodies of state power and administration for shifting to a wartime work schedule, and preparing the population and the state territory for possible military actions.

Art. 3—Defense legislation

The defense legislation consists of the present law, other legislative acts and regulations, decrees issued by the president of the Republic of Moldova, and government decisions which, in accordance with the Constitution, will provide the major guidelines for the state activities in the area of military development and defense.

Chapter II: Responsibilities of the Bodies of State Power and State Administration, and Obligations of Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations in the Defense Area

Art. 4—Parliament responsibilities

The Parliament is responsible for ensuring the state defense, establishing the major directions of military policy, and providing legislative acts in the areas of military development and defense.

Parliament is responsible for approving:

- The military doctrine and military development concept;
- The general structure and troops of the Armed Forces;
- The volume of budget allocations for defense needs;
- The major guidelines for cooperation with other states in military areas;
- Decrees issued by the president of the Republic of Moldova regarding mobilization, demobilization, and declaring a state of war.

Parliament will decide on:

- Declaring state of war in case of armed aggression and signing peace after the cessation of military actions;
- Decreeing and lifting the state of belligerence;
- Utilizing the Armed Forces for fulfilling obligations assumed under international treaties for maintaining peace and security;
- Confirming the appointment of the defense minister recommended by the president of the Republic of Moldova;
- Awarding military rank to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Art. 5—Responsibilities of the president of the Republic of Moldova

The president of the Republic of Moldova serves as supreme commander of the Armed Forces and is personally responsible for the defense capability of the state and the combat capability of the Armed Forces.

The president of the Republic of Moldova will:

- Coordinate the activities of the bodies of state power and state administration in the area of defense;
- Submit to Parliament for approval the planned military doctrine, the concept of military development, and the volume of budget allocations for defense requirements and for financing military programs and orders;

- Approve the plan of Armed Forces development for the respective period, the plan of mobilization of the Armed Forces, and the plan for their utilization;
- Pass decisions for general or partial mobilization, demobilization, and state of war; the decisions are then submitted to Parliament for approval, regarding military draft (compulsory military training) and release from such service;
- Recommend to Parliament candidates for the position of defense minister;
- Issue orders to the Armed Forces for military actions;
- Conduct negotiations and sign international agreements on military cooperation;
- Appoint and relieve the supreme leadership of the Armed Forces, award the highest military ranks to officers, demote officers in rank, and restore to ranks.

Art. 6—The Supreme Security Council [CSS]

The CSS is a consultative body serving the president of the Republic of Moldova, in charge of issuing measures for achieving the major guidelines regarding the organization and unfolding of defense and military development. The CSS's activities will be carried out on the basis of its statute, approved by Parliament.

Art. 7—Government responsibilities

As the central body of executive power, the government is responsible for the defense of the state within the limits of its mandate.

The government will:

- Provide leadership for the activities of the bodies of state power and state administration in its control designed to ensure the country's defense and provide the Armed Forces with weapons, military technology, and other material resources;
- Generally manage the accumulation of human mobilization reserves; decide the number of citizens who need military training and retraining; issue decisions on calling up reservists to duty, recruiting citizens in time of war, and demobilization methods;
- Decide the volume of budget allocations, logistics supplies, equipment, and other technical-material resources for defense and for the maintenance of the Armed Forces;
- Approve plans for stockpiling technical-material resources for the reserve troops; manage the preparation of the economy for mobilization and its transition to a wartime working schedule;
- Ensure the implementation of international agreements on joint defense;
- Establish and close down military schools of all levels and other institutions of military-vocational education;
- Issue decisions on pensions for persons discharged from military service, social and legal protection for military men and their families and for citizens in military training, and social aid to family members of military men who lost their lives (died) in combat training for ensuring the defense of the republic.

The Ministry of Defense will:

- Study and evaluate the political and military situation, and decide the degree of military threat and defense requirements;
- Participate in mapping out the military doctrine, the major guidelines of the military policy, and the military budget;
- Work out and submit to the president of the Republic of Moldova for approval the draft plan for the development of the Armed Forces; the draft plan for the mobilization of the Armed Forces, for providing the troops with weapons and military technology and improving their training, and recommendations regarding budget allocations for defense requirements;
- Establish the number of army corps and reserves, and ensure the training and assignment of military cadres within the limits of its authority;
- Promote a coherent military-technical policy and be the state customer in the procurement, establishment, manufacture, and repair of arms, military technology, and other military property;
- Work out a plan for the mobilization of the Armed Forces and participate in organizing preparations for the mobilization of the economy;
- Plan and implement the training and retraining of skilled military men and the call-up of citizens for military training; retire military men to the reserves, call up reservists for active duty, mobilize the citizenry in time of war, and demobilize them;
- Oversee scientific research in the area of military development;
- Ensure the promotion of a coherent military policy, and cooperation with the armed forces of other countries;
- Ensure the moral and military-patriotic education of the Armed Forces;
- Ensure the payment of pensions to persons discharged from military service; guarantee social and legal protection for military men and their family members and for citizens under military training; ensure aid for family members of military men who lost their lives (died) in the course of fulfilling their service duties, in accordance with the laws in effect.

Art. 9—Responsibilities of other ministries and state departments

The ministries and state departments involved in ensuring the republic's defense will be responsible, in the branches entrusted to them, for delivering the items required for defense, preparing for mobilization in their respective branch, and taking measures to ensure that their branch performs well in time of war in accordance with the plan for preparing the economy for mobilization.

Art. 10—Responsibilities of the bodies of local self-administration

The bodies of local self-administration are responsible, within the limits of their authority, for ensuring that the enterprises, institutions, organizations, decisionmaking factors, and citizens implement the laws dealing with defense and with preparations for the mobilization and operation of the Armed Forces.

The bodies of local self-management will:

- Ensure, on the basis of contracts, the delivery of local products required by military units and institutions; water, heat, and electrical power supplies; means of communication and communal and other services;
- Allocate plots of land for defense requirements in accordance with the law, and oversee their utilization;
- Allocate, on the basis of contracts, service facilities and housing for the needs of military units and institutions, military schools, and enterprises and organizations of the Armed Forces; take measures to preempt illegal actions against military installations, troops, their family members, and the areas in which they live.

Art. 11—Responsibilities of enterprises, institutions, and organizations

The enterprises, institutions, and organizations are responsible for filling state orders and complying with contract obligations for the manufacture, production, supply, and repair of arms, military equipment, and other items and for furnishing logistic supplies to defense installations. The enterprises, institutions, and organizations will create the necessary mobilization capacities and reserves, fulfill mobilization tasks in keeping with the state mobilization plans, provide the personnel with necessary conditions for fulfilling their military obligations, and offer employment to persons discharged from military service and to their family members.

Art. 12—Citizens' rights and obligations

The defense of the Republic of Moldova, its territorial integrity, independence, and constitutional system is a constitutional duty for all the citizens of the republic.

The citizens of the Republic of Moldova who participate in ensuring its defense will benefit from the socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms envisaged by law, including the restrictions conditioned by the fulfillment of their military obligations.

The state will provide the military men with the necessary conditions for fulfilling their military duties and completing their military service, and will award them additional benefits in keeping with the law.

Citizens of other states and stateless persons residing permanently or temporarily in Moldova are not obligated to serve in the army, nor to receive military training in the Republic of Moldova.

Chapter III: The Armed Forces

Article 13—The Armed Forces

The principles of military development, the structure and size of the Armed Forces, the manner in which they will be increased and deployed, and reserves mobilization will be established under the law regarding the Armed Forces and other legislative acts.

Chapter IV: State of Belligerence, State of War, Mobilization, and Territorial Defense

Art. 14—State of belligerence; wartime

The state of belligerence will be declared in the case of armed aggression against Moldova, and will be lifted after the signing of a peace treaty with the enemy.

Wartime begins at the time of declaration of the state of belligerence or at the time of de facto beginning of military actions, and ends on the day and at the hour at which military actions cease in actual fact.

Should troops or armed groups attack or invade Moldovan territory by surprise, the local bodies of military administration are obligated to take all the necessary measures to repel the attacks, without waiting for a declaration of war.

Art. 15—State of emergency

The state of emergency may be declared in certain areas or throughout the country once a state of belligerence has been declared or if there is danger of an armed aggression.

The state of emergency will be established by law.

Art. 16—Mobilization

As soon as a state of belligerence or emergency has been instituted, general or partial mobilization will be declared with a view to deploying the Armed Forces and shifting the economy to a wartime working schedule.

The methods of mobilization will be established by law.

Art. 17—Territorial defense

The territorial defense is organized and carried out for the purpose of protecting and defending the state borders and military installations and communications from enemy attack, combating the [desant] and diversionist forces, and maintaining the state of war regime.

The tasks, organization, and manner of cooperation of the forces engaged in territorial defense will be outlined in the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces.

Chapter V: Ensuring Economic Resources for Defense

Art. 18—Defense financing

The defense will be financed from the state budget in the manner established by law.

Art. 19—Providing the technical-material resources for defense

The technical-material resources for defense will be provided out of the means allocated by the government for defense needs.

The manner and norms of ensuring technical-material resources for defense will be decided by the government.

Chapter VI: Responsibilities for Violating the Defense Legislation

Art. 20—The responsibilities of citizens and decision-making sources

Failure by citizens and decisionmaking factors to implement the defense legislation will incur punishments in accordance with the law.

[Signed] Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova
Chisinau, 17 March 1992

Budget, Structure of Moldovan Army Discussed

92UM0991A Moscow MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS
No 17, 22 Apr 92

[Article by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Army Still Not Created But Generals Fight"; first paragraph is MEGAPOLIS EXPRESS introduction]

[Text] The taking of the oath of allegiance to the sovereign republic started in the middle of April in units of the former Soviet Army stationed on the soil of Moldova. The first callup for the Republic Army was announced in the beginning of May. Called to the colors were about 15,000 young men. The manpower will fill four motorized infantry brigades of the European type, an air defense brigade, a communications brigade, and Army aviation units consisting of 100 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. The Moldova Ministry of Defense plans call for a total manpower of 20,000 men. In addition, there will be 400,000 reservists.

This is an event that can hardly be called unexpected, since Moldova was the first republic of the former Union

to declare aloud its intention to create her own armed forces. However, with the present situation in the area being what it is—one entering open encounters in the Dniester area, observers view the newly-formed Army with a watchful eye.

Moldova Ministry of Defense officials maintain that the Republic Army refuses to be drawn into the Dniester area conflict, regardless of the circumstances. Nevertheless, there are many persons both within and outside the republic who believe that it will be fairly difficult to continue this way. Also what causes a person to think is the fact that the Moldova Ministry of Defense was headed by former Republic Minister of Internal Affairs Major General Ion Kostash (who upon appointment was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general). It was he who was instrumental in creating the Moldovan units of the OPON [Special Purpose Police Detachment], which are presently fighting on the Dniester area borders.

The outskirts of Chisinau, Khyncheshtskoye shosse, 89. This until recently was the headquarters of the South-Western Sector of the Warsaw Pact Unified Armed Forces. It is now the Moldova Ministry of Defense and its headquarters.

In the office of Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolay Turturyan:

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE. Why did Moldova decide to create its own Army, to not participate in the formation of the CIS Unified Armed Forces? Turturyan shrugged his shoulders. "We set out to work in the best interests of our sovereign state. We have no national interests in the North Pole, the Pacific Ocean, Cuba, or the Red Sea (where incidentally I myself once served aboard a Soviet nuclear submarine). But we do have interests here—in Europe—to insure a peaceful life for our people. In addition, in accordance with the military doctrine approved by the republic's Parliament, Moldova does not possess the right to join any military-political bloc which may become a potential threat and source of an arms race. The Unified Armed Forces of the CIS, as far as that goes, do constitute a military bloc. This being so, we have no assurance that this bloc may not become a source of tension. I have in mind the general situation in the former USSR and, in particular, events here in the Dniester area."

[Turturyan, continuing] **A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY.** In the concept of the creation of the Moldova Armed Forces, it is clearly stated that we have no potential adversary at the present time. Any Moldovan citizen can see very plainly that Rumania cannot become our enemy. The same may be said of Ukraine. And Moldova has no borders with any other countries. Nevertheless, we do allow that some time in the future there may appear an enemy to Moldova, one intent on inflicting aggression on us. In this connection, we are proceeding on the assumption that what he uses against us will be conventional—not nuclear—weapons. That is why our

Army's weapons will be limited to the conventional kind. Moldova categorically rejects the use of all types of mass destruction weapons.

PERSONNEL. We want to have a small but effective Army. One that is highly mobile, equipped with modern combat materiel and weapons. In case of war, the Army will be backed up by a militarily trained and organized reserve, of course. But not one like the former Soviet Army, which once every five years would take reservists out to the fields to harvest potatoes, considering that to constitute "continuing training." We have in mind the kind of reserve the USA possesses. The kind that last year received the order, loaded itself onto aircraft literally within one or two days, flew to the Persian Gulf, and set up Desert Storm. Our reserve of that kind will consist of about 400,000 men.

By the year 2000, the Moldova Army should be professional: It will be one only of volunteers, men serving under contract. Until that time comes, the enlisted ranks will be made up of largely draftees; the universal military service law is in effect in the republic. What interests us now is keeping here the former Soviet officers who served here. The trouble is, even though there could be as many as 3,000 cadre officers of Moldovan citizenship (which is more than we need), 50% of them are political workers and military medics. Then there are sailors, pilots, and electronics men, that is, specialists, the kinds of persons for which our Army has no great need. On the other hand, we have a dire need for infantry combined-arms commanders, of which there are few. We are preparing to open a higher military school. In addition, we plan to send youths to study in military VUZ's of other countries: Russia, Ukraine, Rumania, Italy. On a contract basis.

"The Government of the Republic of Moldova is to assure the return to the Republic from other states—CIS member states and the Republic of Georgia—of servicemen who are citizens of the Republic of Moldova, taking into account their wish to continue their service in their Homeland, with conscripts to be returned by 15 May 1992, and officers and warrant officers to be returned, on an individual basis, by the end of 1992." (From the Decree of Republic of Moldova President Snegur of 31 March 1992).

MILITARY BUDGET, ARMAMENTS. We are planning for a military budget that will comprise 7%, possibly as much as 10%, of the Moldovan national budget. Parliament will have the final word, of course, but we will head for the 10% figure for the period of creation of the army, since the latter requires military equipment and weapons. It would be logical, of course, if in the division of military property of the former Soviet Union, Moldova were to be given a portion of this materiel. Unfortunately, our "older brothers" (I am speaking about the leadership of the "large" one—the Moscow Ministry of Defense) have their own way of thinking. Military equipment and armaments were being withdrawn from Moldovan soil over a period of the last few

years. So there is very little of that remaining here. We will make attempts to obtain our share, of course. This is the position we have made known quite a number of times at the negotiations presently under way with the "older brothers." (The talks are headed on the CIS side by Colonel General Boris Pyankov, deputy to Marshal Shaposhnikov.) And we were promised that the necessary amount of military equipment and armaments would be turned over to us.

"We propose to declare as the property of the Republic of Moldova the armaments, transportation equipment, vehicles, base, and other property belonging to units of the Soviet Army stationed within the territory of the Republic." (From the 14 November 1991 Decree of Republic of Moldova President Snegur.)

According to information provided by the Moldova Ministry of Defense Press Center, by the middle of April the oath of allegiance to Moldova was sworn by units of the former Soviet Army stationed in the Moldovan cities of Floreshty and Kagul, plus the Ungeny Artillery Regiment and the Beltsy Missile Brigade.

...Moscow, the "large" ministry of defense.

In the office of Colonel General Boris Pyankov, who heads the military delegation carrying out negotiations with Moldova:

"It would be unusual if I were to speak of our turning anything over to Moldova," stated the colonel general. **"This taking of an inventory of military equipment in the hands of our units located on Moldovan soil is something the republic is doing on its own, on the basis of a one-sided decree issued by President Snegur. We have no intention of transferring anything to them, and this is what I told Moldova Minister of Defense Kostash at the outset. I think that even the Russian Government would not do anything of the sort. Because they want to rapidly form their own armed forces and then resolve the Dniester area problem by force of arms."**

[Pyankov, continuing] It is unfortunate that they have declared as republic property that which has remained in Moldova: all the military depots, the bases, posts. Our units are surrounded by police; they are blocked in, with not a single vehicle, not one piece of iron capable of getting out. Luckily, there are very few weapons there. In Moldova there is not a single tank, not one infantry combat vehicle, no armored personnel carriers at all. The support battalion for South-Western Sector Headquarters did have eight armored vehicles, but that is all. Virtually all the artillery has been removed. There are also not many small arms: a total of about 21,000 pieces. (Compare that with the case of Ukraine, where we left behind 7 million automatic rifles in just one arsenal!) There are some minor items. ZU-23 anti-aircraft weapons. And a regiment, which possesses 24 anti-aircraft weapons. And mortars.

Of serious military units in Moldova there remain, first, the Beltsy Missile Brigade, which is armed with the latest

systems. Second, there is the Ungeny Artillery Regiment, with about 90 heavy guns. Third, the 86th Fighter Aviation Regiment stationed at Markuleshty—that is 30 MiG-29s. We tried to reach some agreement with Moldova regarding exchange of this materiel. We got nowhere with that. So we went ahead and came up with a figure representing the number of millions this materiel costs, reasoning that we could offer Moldova something else of equal value. But once again all they wanted were tanks, BTRs, BMPs... So I said, "No, that is out of the question." Just look at what happened when Bakatin gave them 35 BTRs for the MVD, for the purpose of "agency reinforcement." Now all those BTRs are located in the conflict area. True, their number is decreasing as time goes on: One of them may be knocked out and disabled, another one may be stopped by a land mine... And so, our talks regarding transfer of the Beltsy Brigade missiles have gotten nowhere. It looks like we will lose those missiles, since they will not give them to us without a fight, and a fight is something we are not going to get into. The Beltsy garrison is now surrounded, but it has not given up. There already has been firing there, with our soldier wounded and wounded on the other side, also.

Also fruitless were negotiations regarding exchange of heavy weapons of the Ungeny Regiment and the Markuleshty MiG-29s. And that is not too bad: Half the aircraft there are no longer combat ready—no engines, no spare parts. Wait six months and all the fighters will be nothing but scrap. There will be no one to fly them anyway, since, of 48 pilots, not one took the oath of allegiance to Chisinau. This incidentally holds true for the other units, since the majority of our officers are not taking the Moldovan oath.

In a word, under no circumstances would we take on the function of supplying the Moldovan Army. Who knows, maybe tomorrow they may get the idea of starting a war against us.

OTHER STATES, REPUBLICS

Dudayev Names Air Commander

92UM0973F Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Apr 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Aircraft Over Chechnia"]

[Text] As the commander of the 1st Chechen Squadron, Khayrudi Vesengeriyev, told an INTERFAKS correspondent, scheduled training flights by pilots of the Chechen Air Force have resumed. Thirteen regular Chechen military pilots are participating in them. These officers are also instructors of a group of 30 cadets who have begun classes.

At the press service of Chechnia President Dzhokhar Dudayev, INTERFAKS was informed that Kh. Vesengeriyev, the actual leader of the new Chechen Air Force, has been awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel by order of the commander in chief of the CIS Air Forces.

Caucasus States To Cooperate Militarily

92UM0973A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian
No 17, 20-27 Apr 92 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Bezmenov: "On Foreign Land, with Little Blood and National Resources"]

[Text] The plan of coordinating the actions of the armed forces of the Caucasus was discussed on 22 April at Groznyy by officers from Abkhazia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, and Chechnia. The plan developed for repelling aggression calls for the use of traditional national methods of waging war by the mountaineers.

As the minister of press and information of Chechnia, Movladi Udugov, reported to correspondent "X," the existing plan for repelling external intervention calls for the armed forces and militiamen of other Caucasus republics to join the Chechen Army operationally. The Caucasus armed forces thus formed would wage war by methods traditional for the mountaineers: surprise attacks from mountains and regular guerrilla warfare. The latter means that every house would participate in defending a village; the village would defend the region, which in turn would allocate forces for defending the district or city. Udugov admitted that the defense strategy being planned would legalize the storage of weapons everywhere. Protection structured in this manner is the most reliable, the minister emphasized, recalling that it was tested during the course of the many years of the Caucasus wars.

The Caucasus wars of 1818-1864 ended with the final conquest of the mountain people by the Russian Empire. With an army of some 30,000 men, the mountaineers opposed the 200,000-strong Russian army fairly effectively.

Not relying completely on historical experience, the leadership of Chechnia has already twice tested the plans for repelling external aggression. It was established experimentally that 15,000 Chechens can be armed within 24 hours, 30,000 within three days, and the army would number 500,000 in 10 days. As Udugov noted, in the event of an armed conflict, combat operations will be shifted to the territory of Russia. "It would be stupid to permit the enemy to taunt us on our own soil," said the minister of information of the Chechen Republic.

However, the republic's deputy minister of foreign affairs, Ruslan Madiyev, believes that the armed forces of the mountain peoples will bear the nature of "peace-keeping forces," repeating an earlier comparison of them with the UN "blue helmets." The Chechen Republic makes no claim to the role of a military superpower, Madiyev said and explained: "due to internal problems and inter-clan contradictions." Nevertheless, the Chechen Army presently numbers 10,000 and is the most powerful regional military grouping not counting the North Caucasus Military District.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Antiradiation Guided Missiles of Foreign States

92UM0963B Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK*
in Russian No 2, Feb 92 (signed to press 2 Mar 92)
pp 66-70

[Article by Capt 3d Rank A. Mazmanov: "Antiradiation Guided Missiles of Foreign States"]

[Text] The effectiveness of aviation's action against enemy surface ships largely depends on the degree of suppressing their airborne target detection and on-board anti-aircraft weapons control systems. Among the existing means of accomplishing this task, the most effective are antiradiation guided missiles (ARM's), which are carried by aircraft making up special air defense suppression groups, aircraft strike groups, and aircraft decoy groups. A particular feature of the combat employment of ARM's is that they destroy or disable enemy radars, but do not cause a temporary suspension of their operation as, for example, when using active jamming.

Today, foreign experts are considering two basic concepts of creating and developing aircraft ARM's. According to the first concept, missiles are being developed for hitting radars and weapon guidance systems of surface ships from the near air defense area (50-150 km); according to the second, missiles are being developed for hitting radars of ships and also surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles at short distances.

The first concept stems from a more general direction, given the name "reconnaissance-strike." It envisions detection using signals intelligence assets of functioning air defense assets of a ship task force and fire on them by air defense suppression groups and aircraft strike groups. The second concept is linked to the development of air

defense forces and assets and will be implemented by creating short-range ARM's for self-defense of aircraft and helicopters.

Abroad, the first aircraft ARM, the AGM-45 Shrike, was created in the United States in 1964. It has a passive monopulse seeker which guides the missile to an enemy radar operating in the 2600-9800 MHz range. The possibility of making a strike against targets operating in various frequency bands is ensured by means of replaceable units on the aircraft missile platform, each unit having its own operating band. A unit with the required band is installed on the missile when it is being prepared to be hung on the platform.

The basic specifications and performance characteristics of ARM's are shown in the table below.

The development of tactics for combat use of the Shrike ARM by American aviation in Vietnam was linked to a change in the organization of air defense of the Vietnamese Army. Thus, in the initial period of combat operations by American aviation, single launches of ARM's were made against radars from low and extremely low altitudes, and later from medium altitudes. Subsequently, they were forced to switch to multiple launches of ARM's under the cover of active and passive jamming.

American aviation used the following tactics to suppress air defense weapons:

1. Launching ARM's with the use of high-intensity active and passive jamming from the combat formations of strike, decoy, and diversionary groups in order to complicate air surveillance by the defending side.
2. Using a complex antimissile maneuver by aircraft in the impact zone of surface-to-air missile [SAM] systems before and after launching the ARM's.
3. Combined use of missiles and bombs under cover of jamming. In doing so, the Shrike ARM's were launched with a signal warhead to designate the SAM positions, after which strikes were made with other types of weapons.

Basic Specifications and Performance Characteristics of Antiradiation Missiles of NATO Countries

Name	Manufacturing Country	Year Entered Service	Launch Weight, kg	Warhead Weight, kg	Range, km	Maximum Speed, m/s	Frequency Band of Seeker, MHz	Length, cm	Diameter, cm	Platforms
AGM-45 Shrike	USA	1964	177	66	50	1000	2600-9600	305	20	A-4, A-6, A-7, Vulcan, Kfir
AGM-78 Standard ARM	USA	1968	630	120	80	1000	-	450	34	F-105, F-4G, A-6B
AGM-88A Harm	USA	1983	361	66	80	670	-	420	25	F-4D, A-6E, A-7, EA-6B, A-18, Tornado

Basic Specifications and Performance Characteristics of Antiradiation Missiles of NATO Countries (Continued)

Name	Manufacturing Country	Year Entered Service	Launch Weight, kg	Warhead Weight, kg	Range, km	Maximum Speed, m/s	Frequency Band of Seeker, MHz	Length, cm	Diameter, cm	Platforms
AS-37 Martel	France, Great Britain	1969	520	150	130	1000	390-10900	412	40	Buccaneer, Nimrod, Harrier, Sea Harrier, Jaguar, Atlantic
Armat	France	1984	550	160	120	-	-	390	40	Mirage, Jaguar
Alarm	Great Britain	-	240	70	70	-	2000-40000	420	22	Tornado, Harrier, Hawk, Jaguar, F-16, Lynx helicopter
AGM-112A Sidarm	USA	1989	90	10	8	650	-	267	12.7	F/A-18, F-4, AV-8B, Lynx helicopter
AGM-136A Tacit Rainbow (antiradiation RPV)	USA	-	575	172	90	-	2000-35000	254	68	B-52, A-6E

Despite the fact that no more than 10 percent of the targets were hit by Shrike ARM's, American experts concluded it was necessary to develop this weapon, since when ARM's were used, the enemy SAM crews were forced to turn off their radars, which reduced the effectiveness of enemy air defense weapons.

However, during the course of combat operations in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, serious flaws were also discovered in the Shrike ARM's. The main ones were: tuning of the seeker to one frequency, which limited them to hitting radars operating only in a certain frequency band; the impossibility of hitting the target after its radar was turned off; the short flight range (15 km when launched from an altitude of 3000 meters), requiring the aircraft platform to enter the impact zone of enemy antiaircraft weapons; and the impossibility of launching ARM's from horizontal flight of the aircraft platform.

The AGM-78 Standard ARM entered service in the United States in 1968. Its seeker is equipped with a device for automatic tuning when the target radar changes frequency and a device for storing the target's angular coordinates when its radar is shut off. The missile is equipped with a 120-kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead with proximity and impact fuzes. Several versions of this missile were created. Nevertheless, the Standard ARM also has a number of shortcomings: relatively narrow operating frequency range of the

seeker; complex design; and high cost. Therefore, production was terminated in 1976.

The AGM-88 Harm (High-Speed Antiradiation Missile) was adopted into operational service in the U.S. Air Force and Navy in 1983. In addition to ground and shipborne radars of antiaircraft weapon control systems, it can hit early-warning radars. The missile is equipped with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead with a laser proximity fuze, making it possible to ensure optimum scattering of the warhead fragments taking into account the specific type of radar being suppressed. The seeker has a memory and is able to react to radar emissions in a wide frequency range.

The following modes of combat employment of the Harm are noted:

1. Self-protect mode—when engaging a radar that is a direct threat to the aircraft platform. The parameters of the detected radar are automatically input into the missile's on-board control system from the aircraft's illumination-warning system, which not only classifies the radar and issues initial data, but also assesses the degree of its danger. The pilot makes the decision to launch the missile based on information depicted on a display.

2. Target of opportunity mode—used when preliminary target designation. The missile's on-board equipment detects enemy radar signals, identifies them according to

parameters fed into the computer memory beforehand, and determines the degree of danger. The pilot chooses the necessary target and launches the missile.

3. Pre-briefed mode—for hitting radars whose parameters have been discovered earlier by signals intelligence assets. The ARM is launched after the aircraft reaches a designated point. The seeker looks on the target during the flight. If the target is not detected, the missile self-destructs.

The Harm missile is presently being upgraded in the United States for the Air Force and Navy. The new missile versions have been designated the AGM-88B and AGM-88C. The AGM-88B's seeker is equipped with a memory which provides for operational rerecording of information depending on the type of target to be hit. The goal of further improvement of the next version of the AGM-88C ARM is to increase its effectiveness against modern radars. It is intended to achieve this by upgrading the seeker, increasing the speed of the computer, and doubling the operating band of the seeker.

Antiradiation missiles are also being developed in other countries besides the United States.

In 1969, specialists in France and Great Britain created the Martel AS-37 ARM with a seeker frequency band of 390-1000 MHz. The missile is in the inventory of the air forces and naval aviation of Great Britain and France. The seeker provides guidance for the missile on pulse signals of radars operating on fixed frequencies of four bands and on directional radiation signals of two bands. A changeable unit with the required frequency band is installed on the missile when it is being hung on the platform. The Martel is launched from altitudes of 50-15,000 meters at a distance of 30 to 130 km.

The French-made Armat (Antiradiation Martel) ARM is an improved version of the Martel. Its launch range is from 70 to 120 km depending on the altitude of launch and the altitude of the cruise phase of the missile's flight to the target. Its diving angle to the radar is 80 degrees. The ARM is designed for hitting ground and shipborne radars. Its high-explosive warhead weighs 160 kg. The passive radar seeker provides guidance to a radar with frequency retuning using the transmitter "scintillation" mode.

In 1990, Great Britain successfully tested the Alarm antiradiation missile. The frequency band of the seeker is 2,000-20,000 MHz, with plans to increase it to 40,000 MHz in the future. Three basic modes of combat employment of the Alarm are envisioned.

In the first mode, the missile is launched from the aircraft platform flying at low altitude at a distance of up to 40 km from the target. According to the program, the missile climbs to the desired altitude, begins horizontal flight, and heads towards the target. During the flight, the radar signals received by the seeker are compared with standard signals of typical targets. After lock-on of the target signals, the ARM guidance process begins. If

the missile does not detect the radar, the missile climbs to an altitude of 12 km according to the program. Upon reaching that altitude, the engine shuts off, and the chute opens. During the missile's descent on the chute, the seeker searches for the target. After lock-on of the target, the chute is jettisoned, and the missile glides to the target.

In the second mode, the missile's seeker receives target designation from the aircraft platform's equipment and locks on the target. After this, the missile is launched and guided to the target. The ARM's seeker can lock on the target after launch.

The third mode of combat employment of the Alarm missile combines the first two modes. The missile is launched in line of sight of the target; however, if the ARM does not detect the target, it climbs to the assigned altitude and deploys the chute.

During Operation Desert Storm, massive strikes by aviation of the multinational forces using antiradiation missiles with advance electronic suppression of the communications system and electronics of Iraq's air defenses to achieve surprise and reduce losses from Iraq's air defenses. From the beginning of combat operations, Alarm ARM's were actively used. They were put into service in the countries of the anti-Iraq coalition before testing was completed and, in the opinion of experts, played an important role in suppressing Iraq's air defenses.

Continuous development of air defense forces and assets by creating and putting into service new types of fighters, SAM's, and artillery systems considerably complicates execution of combat missions by aircraft of strike groups and air defense suppression groups. Therefore, in recent years abroad they have been discussing more and more extensively the need to create short-range ARM's and arming aircraft and helicopters with them for self-defense.

In 1989, the United States put into service the AGM-122A Sidarm ARM, which is a modification of the AIM-9C Sidewinder air-to-air missile in which the infrared seeker has been replaced by a passive radar seeker capable of homing on surface-to-air missiles and weapons guidance system antenna posts. It is possible that this missile will turn out to be an interim version until development of an advanced short-range ARM is completed, which is being developed by NATO countries under the SRAM (Short-Range Antiradiation Missile) program.

The United States is continuing to study general concepts of suppressing enemy radars under the AWWFO (Advanced Wild Weasel Follow) program. Within its framework, questions associated with developing new seekers for ARM's are being studied. Foreign military experts believe that the seekers should have two operating modes: in the radio and infrared portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. The AGM-85D/C Maverick aircraft missile with infrared guidance is being considered as the base for this.

In addition, the U.S. Air Force has ordered development of a long-range ARM to combat radar early-warning aircraft.

A fundamentally new stage in resolving the problem of air defense radar suppression is the appearance of anti-radiation remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's). Three versions of antiradiation RPV's have been created within the framework of NATO: the Boave 200 (USA), AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow (USA), and two versions of the German DAR vehicle.

The Tacit Rainbow antiradiation RPV has been developed under contract with the U.S. Air Force and Navy and is a cruise missile capable of loitering in the air for up to 40 minutes. In the future, it is planned to increase the flight time to 80 minutes. The seeker has an operating frequency band of 2-35 GHz. During testing, the Tacit Rainbow antiradiation RPV was carried on B-52 bombers and A-6E carrier-based ground-attack aircraft.

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SECURITY SERVICES

Uneasy Situation for Nakhichevan Border Troops

92UM0994A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 May 92 p 7

[Article by Vladimir Sheleketov under the rubric "A Nearby Border": "In the Red Mountains of Gulistan"]

[Text] Nakhichevan-Moscow—We take off from Moscow, and three and a half hours later we are already treading the concrete runway at the Nakhichevan Airport. The sun shines down and the Little Caucasus Mountains loom in the distance. Suddenly our aircraft is surrounded by sub-machine gunners. They and the infantry combat vehicles near the traffic regulation gate remind us that these are not peaceful parts by far and there are sometimes exchanges of gunfire at night. Thus begins our introduction to the 41st Border Detachment of the Transcaucasus Border District stationed in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

Nakhichevan.... Only 15 minutes or so to the border troop post. Only a few minutes to the line separating us from the border of a foreign state. A canyon, countries to the right and to the left.... In the middle the Araks. A turbid, swollen river. A hut stands there. And a fence. That is the post, the border post. Whose borders are these now? Iran begins at the middle of the Araks. Up to the middle does it belong to the CIS? To Russia? The latter has assumed jurisdiction over it, of course. Did this reduce the number of problems? How are relations between the commanders and the local population? How are the border posts surviving today? The command element of the border troops has offered to explain this to reporters and to the parents of those who serve here.

They have reason to be alarmed. They have received no letters from their boys for several months now. Reports

come from here in Nakhichevan about clashes with the local population and about the disappearance of servicemen. Those alarmed mothers do not want this to be another Karabakh or Dniester region, do not want their children to die here.

On 31 December 1991 thousands of Azerbaijanis tore down the fences and observation towers at Dzhulf and swept into Iran. Two years later, in January of 1992, the scene was repeated. One border troop died and another was seriously wounded in that conflict.

The version of what happened disseminated at that time was that the people wanted to see relatives living in Iran and gain the opportunity to visit Gulistan, a Muslim holy place in the border zone. Col Viktor Zhukov, commander of the 41st Border Detachment, has a different view.

"The border installations were destroyed to ready a withdrawal route to Iran in case an attempt to seize power in the republic failed. If they did not succeed in accomplishing this by peaceful means, however, they planned to take advantage of the open borders to acquire weapons and achieve their objective with arms.

I repeat, this is the viewpoint of Col Zhukov. I will not assume to judge whether it is accurate. I will say that only two pilgrims have visited Gulistan during these two years. And the loving relatives who have gone to Iran with the simplified 15-day pass have frequently returned a couple of days later. They drink, you see, and this is strictly forbidden in Iran. Islam is no joking matter there.

"One thing is not clear. Why are we exposing our young Russian men to bullets?" asked Arkadiy Borisovich Zhizherenko, who came to see his son from Volgograd in Rostov Oblast. He is a construction worker and he knows the military inside out, so to speak. He was in the service himself, and his work in a local committee for the protection of servicemen has given him food for thought.

On 29 February of this year there was a knock at his door. Four men stood at the threshold. Taking a close look at their faces, he recognized NCOs who had once served together with his son at Megri. They had abandoned their military unit and made their way from far-off Armenia to the Don to find refuge from the tyranny occurring there. The warrant officers and some officers work in close league with the militants. The armed militants roam freely throughout the border post. They bust heads, as the common people put it. Arkadiy Borisovich dismissed that kind of talk out of hand, stating tersely: "Are there no limits"?!

Aleksey Zhizherenko stood nearby, seemingly disinterested, as though this did not concern him.

"A sense of duty to the homeland was always instilled in us. But why are we serving here now? Whom are we protecting? What are we saving? We took an oath to a

state which no longer exists, you know. Russia is thousands of versts away. I am from the Don.... What am I doing here?"

Capt Nikolay Pilipenko, commander of the Dzhulfa post, waits in the same "mode" for things to get better.

"We survive on hope alone. The status of the border troops has not been defined, and supplies are hard to get. If one does not have the support of the local population, reliably guarding the border is out of the question. We formerly worked together to catch lawbreakers. The local people provided us with information and helped the border posts with supplies. That is no longer the case. To make matters worse, some of the residents have even become accomplices of the criminals. The border is virtually open today. Around 300 criminals were apprehended last year, most of them smugglers."

What a way to live! The soldier has an enormous burden. In addition to guarding the border, he also has the upkeep and details to perform. And this is in a situation in which the post's manning table is less than 50% filled, and the shortage is predicted to grow. Irregular deliveries of food supplies have left working people with nothing but groats to eat. And no wonder: eggs, fish and other foods are flown in from Moscow by plane. Fuel is also brought in by helicopter. The border post has its own power supply. And its own boiler facility. (In the barracks in which we spent the night the temperature dropped to minus 4° last winter.)

There are few complete families with wives and children here. Those who did remain (and only because they had nowhere to go or it was impossible to take their belongings—things are stolen here), however, prefer to stay inside the post whenever possible. A semiautomatic rifle stands next to a baby carriage in the apartments. One officer confided in us that he had given his wife a pistol.

Isn't it all painfully familiar? Border troop or pilot, sailor or infantryman—they all have the same problems, have the same complaints about the uncertainty of their situation. None of this is new. We have already seen it all—at Sevastopol, in Karabakh, the Dniester region....

Yes, the prestige of the military has clearly not benefited from events of recent years. But why should these young fellows, sweating in their bullet-proof vests, have to feel the entire gamut of guilt for being a part of it, knowing full well that they can easily end up behind bars for failure to carry out an order? We have seen for ourselves that they are perfectly capable of being different.

I do not have the slightest desire to complicate the already difficult situation. I simply want to get to the bottom of it, to understand why some people have to pay for the sluggishness of others. And for how long? It is not normal for a woman to carry a pistol in her purse, to sleep in the embrace of a semiautomatic rifle, to hear the malicious "occupier" every time she goes outside.

It is torture to serve in the Transcaucasus. The removal of the troops would expose our southern borders, however. In what ways might the situation develop. There are two possibilities. If the republic does not want a border detachment here, the troops will probably have to be removed. If it feels the need for a border post, the latter's status and the terms of its presence must be stipulated in an inter-state agreement.

Incidentally, the government of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is fairly firmly committed to the presence of border troops here. While maintaining good relations with the command element, at the same time they stress the fact that these relations have to change, and this is how: "We do not intend to interfere in the combat training, but we have the right to be informed about everything pertaining to movements and exercises. The border troops must be under the authority of the parliament. If Moscow understands that, if we can define the status of the troops in the Transcaucasus, then we can also go a long way toward resolving issues of confrontation between states and peoples."

Relocation of Russian Internal Troops in South Ossetia

92UM0996A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 May 92 First edition p 2

[Unattributed KRASNAYA ZVEZDA report: "In the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs"]

[Text] According to informed sources in the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kovyrev has sent Georgia State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze a letter, informing the latter that the Russian leadership has made a decision to withdraw Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs troops from South Ossetia and relocate them to their permanent station. It is specifically stated in the letter that the Russian authorities, in arriving at the decision, were not unmindful of the new Georgian leadership's recent announcement of its willingness and readiness to work for a just settlement of the conflict.

Also clearly stated in the letter is the Russian leadership's lingering and serious concern over the situation in South Ossetia, in which the populace's lives, security, and tranquility continue to remain at risk.

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